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ABSTRACT

With the massive deployment of mobile devices in sensitive areas such as
healthcare and defense, hardware reliability and security have become hot research topics
in recent years. These topics, although different in definition, are usually correlated. This
dissertation offers an in-depth treatment on enhancing the reliability and security of low
power circuits and systems. The first part of the dissertation deals with the reliability of
sub-threshold designs, which use supply voltage lower than the threshold voltage (Vth) of
transistors to reduce power. The exponential relationship between delay and Vth
significantly jeopardizes their reliability due to process variation induced timing
violations. In order to address this problem, this dissertation proposes a novel selective
body biasing scheme. In the first work, the selective body biasing problem is formulated
as a linearly constrained statistical optimization model, and the adaptive filtering concept
is borrowed from the signal processing community to develop an efficient solution.
However, since the adaptive filtering algorithm lacks theoretical justification and
guaranteed convergence rate, in the second work, a new approach based on semi-infinite
programming with incremental hypercubic sampling is proposed, which demonstrates
better solution quality with shorter runtime. The second work deals with the security of
low power crypto-processors, equipped with Random Dynamic Voltage Scaling (RDVS),
in the presence of Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks. This dissertation firstly
demonstrates that the resistance of RDVS to CPA can be undermined by lowering power
supply voltage. Then, an alarm circuit is proposed to resist this attack. However, the
alarm circuit will lead to potential denial-of-service due to noise-triggered false alarms.
A non-zero sum game model is then formulated and the Nash Equilibria is analyzed.
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NOMENCLATURE

Symbol

Description

η

Delay Factor

Cs

Switching Load Capacitance

s

Surface Potential

Vdd

Supply Voltage

γ

Body Biasing Coefficient

Vth

Threshold Voltage

VT

Thermal Voltage

ρ

Sub-threshold Swing Parameter

VSB

Body Biasing Voltage

Vth0

Threshold Voltage for VSB=0

t

Gate Delay without Vth Variation and body biasing

t'

Gate Delay with Vth Variation

t''

Gate Delay with Vth Variation and body biasing

A

Matrix with connection information of circuit

T

Target Delay of Circuit

x

Decision Vector



Small Positive Number

b

Dealy Improvement Vector

p

Gate Power

Pb

Gate Power with body biasing

IN

Unit Vector

μ

Step Size of Adaptive Filtering

λ

Lagrange Multiplier



Positive Regularization Parameter

1. INTRODUCTION
With the massive deployment of mobile devices in sensitive areas such as
healthcare and defense, hardware reliability and security have become hot research topics
in recent years. These two topics, although different in definition, are usually correlated.
This dissertation offers an in-depth treatment on enhancing the reliability and security of
low power circuits and systems.

1.1. RELIABILITY
Both fabrication-time and run-time effects impact the reliability of integrated
circuits (ICs). With the shrinking of feature size in complementary metal-oxide
semiconductor (CMOS) technology, the fabrication-induced process variation, which
may cause timing failure and impact the performance of circuits significantly, poses a
major challenge for reliability of modern IC [62][63]. There are two different types of
process variation, die-to-die variation and within-die variation. The die-to-die variation,
resulting from wafer-to-wafer, impacts all transistors and interconnects on a die equally,
and just effects the chip performance like frequency, leakage current etc. [64].
Conversely, the within die variations induces different electrical characteristics to
different devices and interconnects within the same die.
Different approaches have been proposed to improve the reliability modern ICs in
super-threshold designs, like Statistical Static Timing Analysis (SSTA) [65] and body
biasing compensation technology [66], etc. However, there are few works on the subthreshold designs, and this dissertation focuses on the effect of within die variation on
sub-threshold designs. In fact, the effect of process variation on timing is extremely
serious for sub-threshold design due to the exponential relationship between delay and
Vth. Therefore, the first part of this dissertation focuses on solving timing problem caused
by process variation in sub-threshold designs.

1.2. SECURITY
Mobile phones and computers are already the most common and basic
communication tools now, and attacks to phones and computers keep increasing recently.
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Considering that the phones and computers are able to access sensitive user data like
bank information and photos etc., people are having higher and higher security
requirements to these devices. In order to improve the security of electrical devices, both
the security of software and hardware should be considered, and this dissertation focuses
on the improvement of hardware security.
Side-channel attack (SCA) is a very popular hardware attack method. SCA
explores the secret information by measuring the emitted outputs from physical devices,
which includes execution timing, power consumptions, electromagnetic leaks, and even
thermal/acoustic emanations [60]. Published SCAs include simple power analysis (SPA),
differential power analysis (DPA), correlation power analysis (CPA), collision attack [61]
and leakage power analysis (LPA), etc. Among them, DPA and CPA are the most
popular and effective ones, which have been reviewed by numerous researchers on
various crypto-systems [60].
Both DPA and CPA are power analysis attack methods, and the attackers measure
the dynamic power consumption, which is dissipated during the transistors switching.
The same input plaintext always results in the same power trace with a given key, thus,
attackers can aggregate the small deviations between the power traces to identify the
correct key. To address this issue, random dynamic voltage scaling (RDVS) has been
proposed in the literature, which is demonstrated to be effective against DPA and CPA
[48][49]. However, the resistance of RDVS to CPA can be undermined through lowering
off-chip power supply voltage, and the second part of this dissertation focuses on
addressing this problem in RDVS cryptosystem.

1.3. WORK SUMMARY
This dissertation consists of three projects.
The selective body biasing problem for post-silicon tuning in sub-threshold
designs is proposed and solved with adaptive filtering algorithm in Section 2, in which,
the selective body biasing problem is formulated mathematically as an integer
programming problem with a statistical linear inequality constraint. In order to address
this problem, the concept of adaptive filtering was borrowed from the signal processing
community. A novel algorithm with binary attractors and power penalty was proposed to
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efficiently solve it. The experiments were based on a set of industrial designs with a 65
nm sub-threshold library. The pass rate is defined as the percentage of Monte Carlo
samples without timing violations out of the 10K samples. Results show that, compared
with a seemingly more intuitive approach, this approach can improve the pass rate by
57% on average with similar standby power and the same number of body biasing gates.
This approach can reduce the standby power on average by 84%, with a 20% pass rate
loss as compared to the approach that biases all of the gates.
Section 3 focuses on developing a more efficient algorithm to solve the proposed
selective body biasing problem, which is formulated alternatively as a linear semi-infinite
programming (LSIP) problem. In addition, the structure of the problem, associated with
the physical meaning of the design, can lead to a novel Incremental Hypercubic Sampling
(IHCS) algorithm. The algorithm solves the LSIP problem through a number of finite
mixed-integer linear programming, and many nice properties of the algorithm are
obtained through rigid mathematical derivations.
Though RDVS technology is a very efficient method to improve the resistance of
cryptosystem against SCA, it is demonstrated that the resistance can be undermined by
providing lower off-chip power supply voltage in Section 4. In order to address this issue,
the following method is proposed in this dissertation. The off-chip power supply voltage
will be monitored, and an alarm could be triggered to protect valued information once the
power supply voltage is lower than the expected voltage (threshold voltage). However,
considering both maintenance cost and the environment noise on power supply voltage,
this problem is formulated as a non-zero sum game model, and the attacker and the
circuit supplier (defender) are the players of this game. The analysis of the Nash
equilibrium in this game shed light on the choice of the optimal threshold voltage, which
is based on parameters of cryptosystem including the value of information, denial-ofservice cost, etc.
Finally, Section 5 discusses the contribution of this dissertation and suggestions
of future works.
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2. PART 1: SELECTIVE BODY BIASING FOR POST-SILICON TUNING OF
SUB-THRESHOLD DESIGNS: AN ADAPTIVE FILTERING
2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Power consumption has become an important design consideration for modern
circuits, which is particularly true for energy constrained applications (e.g., batterypowered systems and wide-area surveillance) [1-4]. Sub-threshold designs (in which
transistors work in a weak-inversion region under lower-than-threshold supply voltages)
have emerged as a compelling solution for low power circuits and systems. The power
consumption of sub-threshold circuits is expected to be within a range of 1pJ/instruction
[4].
Despite significant power reductions, sub-threshold designs are subject to several
challenges. The most critical challenge faced is related to predictability in the subthreshold regime, where the Vth variation is the dominant variation source. The threshold
variation is typically induced by random dopant fluctuations (RDFs). The placement and
number of dopant atoms in the device channel cause random shifts in Vth [3, 4]. The RDF
may increase path delays dramatically given the exponential relationship between Vth and
the drive current in the sub-threshold designs. Gate delay variations can be as high as
300% of the nominal values [4]. Meanwhile, the Vth variation created by the RDF for
each gate is purely random. Thus, the critical paths in different chips of the same design
are likely to be completely different after the fabrication is complete. Therefore,
obtaining a timing closure at the design time is extremely difficult. The post-silicon or
runtime tuning techniques are imperative.
Body biasing is one of the most effective tuning techniques currently available.
This technique uses body effect to modulate the Vth of transistors, and thus changes the
circuit’s power and performance. A total of three different types of body biasing
technologies can be used: forward body biasing (FBB), reverse body biasing (RBB), and
bidirectional adaptive body biasing (ABB). Forward body biasing is typically used to
speed up the circuit during the active mode. RBB is an effective technique that can be
used to decrease the leakage power in standby mode. Finally, adaptive body biasing can
be adjusted into either FBB or RBB at the cost of control and measurement circuitry [7].
However, many existing works on body biasing assumed super-threshold designs either
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explicitly or implicitly [7-11] [27-29], and they cannot be extended directly to the subthreshold regime, primarily as a result of the exponential dependency of delay on the
purely random Vth variation. The details are discussed in Section II.
Bo Zhai [4] derived a statistical model of the sub-threshold circuit delay and
proposed the reduction of energy consumption by optimizing the pipeline’s depth.
However, it assumes that path delays are independent random variables with lognormal
distributions, and that the maximum of two lognormal random variables is still
lognormal. Although the gate delays are independent, the path delays are possibly
dependent because different paths may share gates.
Bo Liu, etc. in [6] were the first to examine the possibility of body biasing in subthreshold designs. They suggested that both gate resizing and a fuzzy logic controller
could be used to reduce the effect of process variation. However, the additional fuzzy
logic controller involves extra dynamic power. In addition, in that approach body biasing
is applied to all of the gates. That introduces large power and area overhead.
Nearly all of the body biasing studies conducted [6-11] assumed the presence of
multiple body biasing voltage domains. These domains increase not only the routing but
also the control complexity, which makes these schemes hard to be employed in largevolume commercial production. Multiple body biasing schemes also suffer from less
latch-up immunity, less threshold voltage controllability, more substrate noise
vulnerability and less gate oxide reliability. Considering the relative importance of
reliability and cost, it is more practical to explore a scheme that uses only one body
biasing voltage domain, preferably with binary control decision, i.e., whether a single
body biasing voltage should be applied or not.
Towards this end, this dissertation puts forward a novel body biasing scheme for
sub-threshold designs which tries to find a number of selective gates for body biasing so
that the timing violation caused by random Vth variation is eliminated statistically with
minimum standby power overhead. This scheme applies the same FBB voltage to all of
the selected transistors so that the design cost can be reduced. The proposed algorithm is
an offline algorithm, which selects the set of gates for body biasing at design-time.
During post-silicon tuning, the biasing voltage is simply applied to the gates selected.
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Simply assuming the worst case for all the gates will not be an option here, as the
timing benefit brought by body biasing for a single gate in the sub-threshold regime can
barely cancel its own delay increment in the worst-case scenario. Accordingly, for worstcase scenario, all the gates have to be selected as body biasing gates. On the other hand,
the probability that all the gates are in the worst-case corner at the same time is extremely
low. It is thus meaningful to explore an alternative statistical solution.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Both the background and
motivation behind this study are summarized in Section 2.2. The timing model and
problem formulation are introduced in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the proposed
adaptive filtering algorithm. Experimental results are presented in Section 2.5 and
concluding remarks are given in Section 2.6.

2.2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
The biggest challenge in sub-threshold designs is the unpredictability brought by
the exponential dependence of delay variation on purely random threshold voltage
variations.
A 65 nm industrial sub-threshold design was used as an example to illustrate this
challenge. The normalized path delay, without variation, is given in Figure 2.1 (a). This
design was processed through timing optimization, and the critical path ID was 5436.
Meanwhile, 10K Monte Carlo simulations were run for σ/μ = 10% Vth variation. The
percentage that each path can become critical was calculated as in Figure 2.1 (b).
The highest possibility at which a path can become critical is approximately
1.46%, which means that many other paths may become critical. Accordingly, it is no
longer possible to design for timing closure based on a selected number of critical paths,
and post-silicon tuning is imperative to address the problem.
A number of researchers have proposed the use of body biasing for post-silicon
tuning, but for super-threshold designs [7-11] [27-29]. Most used ABB technology,
which can improve the performance of slow modules to fix the timing problem. It can
also reduce the leakage power of fast modules. Additional circuitry is, however, needed
for either runtime monitoring or voltage adjustments, increasing the area over-head.
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Figure 2.1. Normalized path delay and critical path distribution: (a) normalized path
delay without Vth variation, and (b) critical path distribution with Vth variation in a 65
nm sub-threshold design
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A test chip with an on-chip body biasing generator was implemented to
demonstrate the effectiveness of bidirectional ABB [7]. Critical paths were replicated as
part of an ABB control circuit to generate one or multiply body biasing voltages.
However, it assumes that a small set of critical paths can be identified. This assumption is
incorrect for sub-threshold designs, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
A lookup table based ABB scheme was proposed to control multiple functional
blocks on a single chip independently. Different body biasing voltages were stored in a
look-up table. Sensors were used to detect the temperature variation, and then suitable
body biasing voltages were obtained for corresponding blocks [10]. One disadvantage
associated with this method is the significant area overhead of additional circuitry.
Another is the large number of delay and leakage measurements required to obtain the
final solution. Though the authors tried to decrease the requirement of delay and leakage
samples by using a polynomial timing model, it only worked for super-threshold designs
and could not be extended to the sub-threshold region.
A joint co-optimization workflow was proposed to minimize the leakage power,
under a given delay constraint, at a given yield in [27]. It included design-time gate-level
sizing and post-silicon ABB adaptation. A robust adjustable linear program algorithm
was given to solve the problem. Extending this solution to a sub-threshold design is
difficult, because this optimization problem requires a linearized delay model (which is
difficult to obtain in the sub-threshold region). In contrast, for multiple optimal body
biasing voltages, additional body biasing voltage generators are required to implement
the biasing voltages. This not only further increases the area overhead to the body biasing
gate area and routing cost, but also suffers from less latch-up immunity, less threshold
voltage controllability, more vulnerable to substrate noise and less gate oxide reliability.
One of the most common problems associated with ABB is the large area
overhead when body biasing is provided to all of the gates. Considering multiple body
biasing voltages are needed in ABB, almost all the ABB related papers use clustering
methods to solve this problem. However, most cluster technologies are based on blocks
that utilize the spatial correlation of process parameters. [9] [28] proposed the use of
variability-aware technique to cluster gates using distributions and correlations of gate
delays. This technique assumes that the relationship between the delay and the variation
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source is linear. It also assumes that the variations at different gates are spatially
correlated. Neither of these, however, hold true in sub-threshold designs.
Several researchers have tried to provide body biasing to part of gates to decrease
area overhead. [8] tried to minimize the standby power by selecting a subset of rows from
a row-based standard cell layout. Body biasing was applied to those selected rows that
contained the most timing critical gates. The timing constraints, however, were
deterministic. This does not fit the strong log-normal random variations in sub-threshold
designs.
To sum up, most of the previous papers on body biasing only work for superthreshold. They either assume a small set of critical paths, or utilize a linearized delay
model and spatially variation information which do not hold in sub-threshold designs.
Meanwhile, there exists huge routing area and standby power overhead for multiple body
biasing voltages which prohibits them from being used in practical industrial application.
In order to address the above issues, this paper proposes to only apply one postsilicon body biasing voltage to a limited number of selected gates in order to optimize the
standby power overhead. Both the reduced routing area cost and improved reliability are
preferable in practice, because only one body biasing voltage is utilized.

2.3. MODELING AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As mentioned in the introduction section, in order to reduce as much standby
power overhead as possible for sub-threshold designs, a minimal set of gates needs to be
identified. Thus, the timing violations can be statistically eliminated by providing body
biasing to this set. The following is divided into three subsections. The timing model is
defined in the first section, and the problem is formulated mathematically in the second.
The third subsection contains an example that illustrates this formulation.
2.3.1. Models and Assumptions. As will be shown later, a large number of delay
samples under the random Vth variation is needed to train the adaptive algorithm to be
proposed. The time-consuming Monte Carlo simulation is not a viable option here. An
analytic delay model that is less accurate but much more efficient is thus used.
The gate delay is assumed to follow the sub-threshold statistical model [4-5] [1213]:
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Vdd

Vth

Vth

1
1  VT VT
td  CsVdd
e
e   e VT ,
2
Is0

(2.1)

where  is the delay factor and Cs is the switching load capacitance. Vdd is the supply
voltage and Vth is the threshold voltage. VT is the thermal voltage and  is the sub¬threshold swing parameter. The constant  can be obtained by using HSPICE to measure
the gate delay at typical Vth.
In addition, the threshold with body biasing can be calculated based on the
equation

Vth  Vth 0   ( | 2s  VSB |  | 2s |),

(2.2)

where  (the body biasing coefficient) and  s (the surface potential) are obtained from
the technology library [12]. VSB is the body biasing voltage, and Vth 0 (the threshold
voltage for VSB  0 ) is a random variable due to the process variation.
The following assumptions are also made to hold for sub-threshold designs:


The routing of body biasing nets has a minimal impact on signal nets, and thus,
signal net’s wire delay remains constant.



Most of paths in the sub-threshold design can become critical paths. This is due to
purely random Vth variation and the exponential relationship between delay and
Vth variation. The example given in Section 2.2 (Figure 2.1 (b)) was used to
demonstrate this assumption.



Only one body-biasing domain will be used (i.e., all of the gates selected for body
biasing will use the same body voltage, and only one user-specified biasing
voltage is available). This assumption is made to significantly reduce the
hardware cost associated with body biasing.
The last two assumptions make this work unique. The system to be identified is

sparse (considering a very limited number of gates) and binary; there are only two
controlling options for each gate: using body biasing or not. This permits the formulation
of the problem in a very interesting way as given below.
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2.3.2. Problem Formulation. Without loss of generality, only combinational
logic is considered in the following discussion, because for sequential logic, the
combinational logic can be checked between each pair of the registers separately.
For a design with a total of N gates and M paths, a matrix A with M rows and N
columns is defined to represent the circuit connection in which each row stands for a path
and each column stands for a gate. If a gate Gn appears in path Pm, the element at m-th
row and n-th column of the matrix A (i.e. Am,n ) will be set to 1, otherwise it is set to 0.
Three N×1 vectors are defined as t , t' , and t'' , in which each element stands for a
gate’s t , t' and t'' delay in different scenarios:


t is the gate delay without Vth variation or body biasing,



t' is the gate delay with only Vth variation,.



t'' is the gate delay with both Vth variation and body biasing.
Thus, t is the ideal gate delay with no process variation and t' is the gate delay

sample with random normal distributed Vth variation that may cause timing violations. In
theory, since Vth could deviate from its nominal value in each direction, t' may be either
longer or smaller than t . In order to address the possible timing violation, some gates will
be selected for body biasing, and their gate delay after body biasing is t'' .
With the definitions above, when there are no variations or body biasing, the
maximum delay, T for this circuit could be obtained by

T  max  At  .

(2.3)

The circuit is assumed to have passed the timing sign-off when there is no process
variation. Accordingly, this delay T will be taken as the target of the post-silicon body
biasing tuning. The delay matrix A t' ( M  N ) when there is Vth variation can be
calculated as

At '  Adiag t ' ,

(2.4)

where diag t ' is a N  N diagonal matrix with diagonal vector t' . Similarly, the delay
matrix A t '' ( M  N ) when there are both Vth variation and body biasing is

At ''  Adiag t ''.

(2.5)
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Therefore, when body biasing is applied, the delay improvement matrix A tt '
( M  N ) is

Att '  At '  At ''  Adiag t ' t ''.

(2.6)

The overall required delay improvement vector b ( M 1 ) required to fulfill the
target delay is

b  At ' TI M ,

(2.7)

where I M is a unit vector ( M 1 ) .
A decision vector x ( N 1 ) is defined, in which each element represents the
decision of body biasing control on that gate, i.e., 1 means applying body biasing to that
gate and 0 means no body biasing. The proper x must be chosen to ensure the overall
delay improvement for every path is larger than the required delay improvement, thereby
fulfilling the timing constraint,

prob Att 'x  b > 1-  ,

(2.8)

where  is a small positive number and Att ' x  b represents a component-wise
inequality (i.e., am,tt ' x  bm , m  1...M , where a m,tt ' is the mth row of A tt ' , and bm is the
mth element of b ).

When the delay is modelled in a statistical way, this is a robust linear
programming problem which could be considered in a statistical framework [15].
However, due to the fact that the delay is log-normal and the paths are not independent
with each other, it is not tractable since the joint distribution is very difficult to obtain.
Therefore, the approach in [15] cannot be used, and (2.8) can be further converted to a
minimization problem using the logarithmic barrier function and solve it using adaptive
filtering based algorithm later in Section 2.3.
Additional two 1 N vectors are defined as p , and p b , in which each element
stands for Gn gate’s power pn without body biasing, and power pb, n with body biasing.
Therefore, for x , the total power P will be
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P = pb x + p  I N  x 

(2.9)

= pI N   pb  p  x,

where I N is a unit vector ( N×1 ).
In order to decrease the power, it is proposed to solve the following optimization
problem
min
subject to

 pb  p  x
prob Att ' x  b > 1-  .

(2.10)

where  pb  p  x is used as the optimization target. Considering that pI N is constant, it is
the same as pI N   pb  p  x . It should be noted that the integer set in (2.10) is nonconvex and the coefficients of the constraint are statistical. Accordingly, the problem is
NP hard. A novel adaptive filtering algorithm will be proposed to solve it below. Before
that, an example to illustrate the above modeling process is first given in sub-section
2.2.3 as below.
2.3.3. An Example. Taking the circuit T0 as an example, there are a total of six
2-input NAND gates identified by number G1 - G6 respectively in network T0, shown in
Figure 2.2. There are 11 paths in total. If the same worst-case gate delay is used for any
path going through a gate (regardless of the input pin difference), the path number can be
further reduced to 7, as shown in Table 2.1.

A
G1
G5

B

OUT1
C

G3
G2
G6

D

OUT2
E

G4

Figure 2.2. Network of T0.
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Table 2.1 Paths of T0.
Path ID
P1

Gates In The Path
G1,G5

P2

G2,G3,G5

P3

G2,G3,G6

P4

G2,G4,G6

P5

G3,G5

P6

G3,G6

P7

G4,G6

According to TABLE I, the matrix A of T0 is

1
0

0

A  0
0

0
0


0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 
1 1 0 0 1

1 0 1 0 1 .
0 1 0 1 0

0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 

(2.11)

And the t vector ( 6 1 ) can be express as

t  [t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 ] ,
T

(2.12)

where tn ( n  1, 2,...,6 ) is the gate delay without process variation or body biasing for
gate number n . Considering the longest path includes 3 NAND gates, the target delay T
is
T  max  At 
 max{t2  t3  t5 , t2  t3  t6 , t2  t4  t6 }.

(2.13)

The t' and t'' vector could be obtained similarly, in which tn' and tn'' means the

t ' delay with process variation only and t '' the delay with both process variation and
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body biasing for gate number n . The delay improvement matrix A tt ' ( 7  6 ) of T0 can
then be expressed as

0
t '1  t ''1
 0
t '2  t ''2

 0
t '2  t ''2

t '2  t ''2
 0
 0
0

0
 0
 0
0


0

0

t '5  t ''5

t '3  t ''3

0

t '5  t ''5

t '3  t ''3
0
0
t '4  t ''4
t '3  t ''3

0
0
t '5  t ''5

0

t '3  t ''3
0
0
t '4  t ''4

0
0


0 
t '6  t ''6 

t '6  t ''6  .
0 

t '7  t ''7 
t '7  t ''7 
0

(2.14)

Then the required delay improvement vector b ( 7 1 ) is
b  [t '1  t '5  T

t '2  t '3  t '5  T

t '2  t '4  t '6  T

t '3  t '5  T

t '2  t '3  t '6  T

t '3  t '6  T

t '4  t '6  T ]T .

(2.15)

Note that both t ' and t '' for each gate are independent lognormal random
variables since the Vth variations follow independent Gaussian distributions.

2.4. ALGORITHM
In this section, a novel adaptive filtering based framework is proposed to solve the
problem formulated in (2.10), along with its complexity analysis. The framework
overview is illustrated in Figure 2.3, which includes three steps: data pre-processing,
representative path selection, and APA-BA-PP.
The pre-processing step is based on the gate level Verilog file. Both path and gate
information are extracted first. The sub-threshold timing model is then built through
HSPICE simulation. The matrices and vectors are prepared last as described in Section
2.2.
A representative path selection stage is employed because the path number can
have an exponential relationship with the gate number. It selects a set of representative
paths, the number of which does not exceed the number of gates. The details are
described in Section 2.3.1.
Finally, the APA-BA-PP algorithm actually selects the gates for body biasing and
is the most important part of the framework. The details are described in Section 2.3.2.
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Gate Level Verilog Code
Data Pre-processing

Representative Path Selection

APA-BA-PP

Output Solution X

Figure 2.3. Adaptive filitering framework overview

2.4.1. Representative Path Selection. This step suppresses the potentially huge
path number. A similar approach as described in [14] [26] is employed. To illustrate the
idea, circuit T0 is used again as an example. Its 7 paths are expressed in the graph in
Figure 2.4. Based on this graph, the delay of path P2: G2→G3→G5 and P4:
G2→G4→G6 can be rewritten accurately as the linear combination of the remaining
paths. For example, P2  P5  P3  P6 , therefore, P2 can be well represented by P5, P3,
and P6.

G1
G2

G5
G3

G4

G6

Figure 2.4. Network of T0.

In general, the representative path selection algorithm can find r paths, the linear
combination of which can represent the delay of other paths. This will reduce the
dimension of A to r  N , in which r = rank  A  . Since rank  A  will not exceed its
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column number which in turn is equal to the gate number, the number of representative
paths selected will not exceed the gate number. The details are as follows.
To select these representative paths, singular value decomposition (SVD) is
performed on matrix A firstly,

A  UVT ,

(2.16)

and then apply QR decomposition using column pivoting on U r , which is a sub-matrix
formed by the first r columns of U
UTr Pr  QR.

(2.17)

The matrices Q and R are found during the procedure and help identify the
output permutation matrix Pr . After obtaining Pr , to identify the r representative paths,
PrT A is computed and the sub-matrix formed by the first r rows is taken as A r which

in turn corresponds to r paths.
It should be noted that considering the delay is modelled as log-normal
distribution, it is not guaranteed that the other non-presentative paths can also satisfy the
timing constraints. Even for the representative paths, it is not guaranteed that they can
satisfy the delay constraints for every possible sample of the log-normal distributions.
However, the use of representative paths is still helpful to conquer the complexity issue
and to highlight the essential circuit structure information.
The SVD and QR decomposition in this algorithm are only a one-time cost for
each design. Sophisticated algorithms are available for solving these procedures.
Furthermore, because matrix A is very sparse, the runtime of SVD could be further
reduced through exploiting this sparsity. The analysis of the computation complexity will
be detailed in Section 2.3.3.
2.4.2. APA-BA-PP Algorithm.

After reducing A to A r , the formulation in

(2.10) can be simplified as:

min
subject to

 pb  p  x

prob Att 'x  b > 1-  ,

(2.18)
(2.19)
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x  0,1 ,

(2.20)

m  1...r.

The formulated problem in (2.18)-(2.20) contains three parts: the inequality
timing requirement (2.19), the integer set constraint (2.20) and the minimization target of
power cost (2.18). In this subsection, a novel algorithm is proposed to solve this problem:
the inequality timing constraint (2.19) is first transformed to a logarithmic barrier
optimization target; the power minimization target (2.18) is then added in the cost
function as power penalty, and the integer set constraint (2.20) converted as the binary
attractor in the cost function. The details will be elaborated below.
At first, in order to handle the inequality constraint, the logarithmic barrier
function [14] is utilized to convert the inequality constraint to the following
unconstrained optimization

-log  aTm,tt ' x  bm .
r

min

(2.21)

m 1

This problem is still challenging as the coefficients are all statistical. Towards
this, the adaptive filtering concept could be borrowed from the signal processing
community to aid in developing a novel algorithm to solve it.
Considering that the delay improvement matrix A tt ' and the required delay
improvement vector b are all lognormal distributions, following the way [15] handles the
impulse noise, a constraint on the update of the adaptive filter coefficients is added:
-log  aTm,tt '  k  x  k   bm  k  
r

min

m 1

subject to

(2.22)

x  k   x  k  1 2   ,
2

2

where k is the sampling time index for the different random lognormal distributions, and

 is a parameter ensuring that x(k ) and x(k - 1) does not change dramatically. This can
also be viewed as the minimum disturbance constraint. The variable  controls the
convergence level of the algorithm and it should be as small as possible. The a-posterior
error is

 m  k   bm  k   aTm,tt '  k  x  k  , m  1...r.

(2.23)
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Considering that the optimization target in (2.22) is convex, the method of
Lagrange multipliers could be used, and the unconstrained cost function of (2.22) can be
obtained as
r

J  x  k   =-log    m  k  
m 1

(2.24)

2
   x  k   x  k  1 2   2  ,



where  is the Lagrange multiplier. The derivative of the cost function with respect to
the vector x(k) is

J  x  k  
x  k 

=-

ATtt '  k  I
r

    k  

(2.25)

m

m 1

 2  x  k   x  k  1  .
Setting the derivative to zero, (2.26) is gotten as

x  k   x  k  1 

1
2

ATtt '  k  I
r

    k  

.

(2.26)

m

m 1

Substituting (2.26) into the constraint (2.22), (2.27) is obtained
r

    m  k  

1
m 1

.
T
2
I Att '  k  ATtt '  k  I

(2.27)

r

Substituting (2.27) into (2.26), the constant

    k   can be canceled, and the
m 1

m

update equation for the x vector is:

x  k   x  k  1 

 ATtt '  k  I
IT Att '  k  ATtt '  k  I

.

(2.28)

In practice, a small positive regularization parameter  is added in the
denominator of the second term to prevent the divide-by-zero problem. The update
equation is then
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ATtt '  k  I

x  k   x  k  1  

IT Att '  k  ATtt '  k  I  

.

(2.29)

Next, consider the integer constraint, which is non-convex and NP hard. In order
to conquer the NP-hard integer set problem, the idea of the zero-point attractor in [16] is
extended to a binary attractor. First, the concept of the l0 norm, that counts the number
of non-zero entries, is introduced.
Considering that l0 norm is a Non-Polynomial (NP) hard problem, it is generally
approximated by a continuous function. A popular approximation [17] is
N



x k  0   1 e
n 0

  xn  k 

,

(2.30)

where the two sides of (2.30) are strictly equal when the parameter  approaches
infinity. Here, it is extended to involve both 0 and 1 as below

xk 

N



  1 e
0,1
n 0

  xn  k 

e

  xn  k  1

To illustrate how (2.31) works, the function 1  e

.

  xn  k 

(2.31)

e

  xn  k 1

is plotted in

Figure 2.5. It is clear that it outputs 1 if the input is neither 0 nor 1, which is also the
number of non-zero and none-one entries. The motivation behind the binary attractor is
that the following target

min

x  k  0,1

(2.32)

minimizes the total number of non-zero and non-one entries, which requires the optimal
solution to belong to the 0,1 integer space. Considering the power minimization target
too, the proposed cost function in (2.21) can be rewritten as

-log   aTm,tt '  k  x  k   bm  k  
r

(2.33)

m 1

   pb  p  x  k  1   x  k 

0,1

,

where   pb  p  x  k  1 is the power penalty term,   0 is a step-size factor of the
power penalty, and   0 is the strength for binary attractor.
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Figure 2.5 The continuous approximated function of the new l0,1 norm counting both
non-zero and non-one entries, which outputs 1 when the input is neither 0 nor 1.

Therefore, by minimizing (2.33), the update of the adaptive filtering should be
modified to:

x  k   x  k  1  

ATtt '  k  I
IT Att '  k  ATtt '  k  I  

   pb  p    x  k 

where  x  k 

0,1

0,1

(2.34)

,

is the gradient with respect to x  k  . Note that the current form of

(2.34) cannot be implemented in practice, since the term depends on x  k  , the exact a
priori

value

of

which

x  k   x  k  1 2   2
2

xk 

0,1

 x  k  1

0,1

is

is

not

applied

,  xk 

filtering should be modified to:

0,1

known.
in

Since

(2.22),

  x  k  1

0,1

it

the
is

additional
reasonable

constraint
to

assume

. Therefore, the update of the adaptive
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x  k   x  k  1  

ATtt '  k  I
IT Att '  k  ATtt '  k  I  

   pb  p    x  k  1

0,1

(2.35)

.

Substituting (2.31) into (2.35), the final update of the adaptive filtering is:

x  k   x  k  1  

ATtt '  k  I
IT Att '  k  ATtt '  k  I  

  pb  p    sgn  x  k  1   e
 sgn  x  k  1  I   e

  x k 1  I

  x k 1

(2.36)

,

where  is the component-wise multiplication, I is a unit vector, and sgn   is
component-wise sign function defined as

x
 , x  0;
sgn  x    x
0, elsewhere.


(2.37)

The algorithm described by (2.36) is denoted as affine projection algorithm with
binary attractor and power penalty (APA-BA-PP). The final algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1.
The interpretation of the proposed adaptive algorithm is presented as follows. The
adaptive filtering algorithm sequentially updates its filter coefficients along the negative
gradient direction for each input Att '  k  with log-normal distribution, and can be
expressed as

xnew  x prev  gradient correction  power penalty
 binaryattraction

(2.38)
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Algorithm 1: APA-BA-PP
a. Initialization:
 , 0 , 0 ,  0 , 
k  0, x 0  0,0,...,0

T

b. Load A, p, pb and r  rank  A 
c. Perform SVD decomposition on A  UVT
d. Perform QR with column pivoting on matrix U r composed
by the first r columns of U . UTr Pr  QR , where Pr is
permutation matrix.
e. Take A r to be the sub-matrix formed by the first r row of

PrT A .

f. Calculate delay t and T  max  At 
g. Loop: while k  K
h. Calculate random delay t ' and t '' , and
At '  Adiag t ' , At ''  A r diag t ''
Att '  At '  Att '  A r diag t ' t ''
b  A r t ' TI

i.

Calculate step-size
k  k 1 , k  k 1 ,  k   k 1

j.

Update the filter
x k  x k 1  k

ATtt 'I
IT Att ' ATtt 'I  

k  pb  p    k  sgn  x k 1   e
 k  sgn  x k 1  I   e

  x k 1

  x k 1  I

k. k  k  1

For the first term of gradient correction, according to the definition of matrix A tt ' ,

ATtt '  k  I is the summation of delay improvement of each gate over all the representative
paths at timing index k, and after normalization, this information is used to select the
gate. At each iteration, the algorithm adopts the body biasing assignment according to a
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single case of variation. Different samples in subsequent iterations may cause the
assignment solution to move in different directions, and a move in one iteration may
deteriorate the timing yield of previous samples. However the assignment solution will
move towards the direction that moderates most of the variations, in the long run. It is
reasonable that the gates with accumulated higher overall delay improvement over
different samples of the random distribution tend to be critical and this works in a similar
way of sorting the gates based on their statistical summations of delay improvement
contribution.
The second term, power penalty, is a constant negative vector based on the extra
power cost for each gate if it is selected to apply body bias. This power penalty is used to
suppress the gates with higher power cost to be selected.
Finally, the third term, binary attraction, imposes an attraction to zero and one on
the coefficients near zero and one. To further illustrate the impact of the binary attractor,
it is plotted in Figure 2.6. After each iteration, a filter weight will increase a little when it
is less than zero, or decrease a little when it is larger than zero. Meanwhile, the filter
weight less than one will increase a little and decrease a little if larger than one.
Therefore, the binary attractor will attract the non-zero and non-one weights around zero
and one. The range of attraction depends on the parameter  . In the adaptation, the gate
with lower delay improvement contribution (near zero) in the past indicates a higher
possibility of remaining not selected, and the one with higher contribution (near one)
tends to remain selected. According to Figure 2.6., the closer it is to zero and one, the
greater the attraction intensity is. In conclusion, the binary attractor could smooth and
remove the effect of abrupt delay variation due to exponential delay relationship.
According to the above analysis, it is clear that the step-size  and  determine
the performance of the proposed algorithm. In order to further improve the performance,
a simple variable step-size strategy is used in which the step-sizes are reduced by a
constant factor [18]. This is because when more and more samples are accumulated in the
sorting, the resulting rank should become more stable, therefore the power penalty and
binary attractor can gradually be removed. More complicated variable step-size algorithm
could be studied in the future [18]. Assume the algorithm runs for K iterations in which K
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Figure 2.6 The plot of the binary attractor, which is the negative gradient direction of new
l0,1 norm, imposes an attraction to zero and one on the coefficients near zero and one.

is a user-specified number. The larger K is, the more gates will be selected, the impact of
K on the pass rate and gate selection will be shown later.
To sum up, the proposed APA-BA-PP algorithm can sort the gates based on their
statistical contributions to overall delay improvement considering both the standby power
cost and the binary decision rule. In practice, in order to further regulate the right-hand
side of (2.36), a sigmoidal function could be applied [25], and the final gate set should be
selected according to the final ranking of the solution based on the balance between the
pass rate requirement and the tolerance of standby power. However, it should be noted
that the rigid convergence analysis of the proposed algorithm is still open for future work.
In practice, the algorithm could be enforced to stop after a maximum number of iterations

K are achieved (in experiments of this dissertation K = 5000 ). Experimental results
show that such a heuristic can provide solutions with reasonably good quality.
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2.4.3. Complexity Analysis. This section is concluded with the complexity
analysis of this APA-BA-PP algorithm. SVD decomposition is done to path matrix A (
M  N ), where M is the number of paths and N is the number of gates. This APA-BA-

PP algorithm deals with the combinational circuits between registers, similarly to those in
the timing analysis. For modern designs with millions of gates, the number of gates
would still be in the range of thousands.
For most designs, A is usually very sparse. Therefore, this sparse property can be
utilized to significantly decrease the runtime of SVD. For example, the randomized SVD
[30] [33] runs very fast on large scale sparse matrix. According to reference [30], the
complexity of randomized schemes SVD could achieve O  MNlog(r) , where r is number
of representative paths, which ideally should be the rank of the matrix A . For extremely
large number of paths, the runtime could be further decreased through using smaller r
than the real rank of A at the cost of slight accuracy loss, as will be shown in the
experimental results.
The complexity of QR with column pivoting on matrix U r with size M  r is

O (M +rlog f (r))r 2  , f  1 [31], which is also linear w.r.t. the path number. Yet
compared with SVD decomposition, it is well known that QR has a much smaller affine.
Therefore, the runtime of QR is also acceptable.
Finally, for the proposed APA-BA-PP algorithm, matrix operations are involved
with complexity O  Nr  in each iteration. Accordingly, the total complexity is O  KNr  ,
where K is the total iteration number.

2.5. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
The path extraction was implemented in Python and the remaining parts were
implemented in C++. Eigen 3.0 library was used for the QR decomposition [18], and
redsvd package was used for SVD [19]. Simulations are performed based on five 65 nm
industrial sub-threshold designs as listed in Table 2.2, which includes the path number,
gate number along with the rank of matrix A (the number of representative paths) for
each design. The supply voltage is 200 mV, and the body biasing voltage VBS is set to 400 mV for PMOS and 400 mV for NMOS. The body biasing voltage is selected so that
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when all the gates are biased, 100% pass rate can be achieved for Vth variance less than
8%. All pass rates reported in this section were obtained through 10K Monte Carlo
simulations. In each simulation, it works only if all the paths satisfy the target delay,
otherwise it fails. The pass rate is the ratio of the number of working simulations to the
total number of simulations. The experiments were conducted on a workstation equipped
with quad-core 2.4 GHz CPU and 96 GB RAM.
The proposed adaptive algorithm is compared with two intuitive methods. The
first one “all body biasing” applies body biasing to all the gates in the design. The second
one “weighted delay” selects body biasing gates based on the descending order of the
weighted delay of each gate. The weighted delay of a gate is defined as the product of the
number of paths going through a gate and its corresponding delay improvement when
body biasing is applied. This metric evaluates the overall importance of a gate in timing.
For a fair comparison, the same number of gates are selected for the weighted delay
method and the proposed adaptive filtering method.

Table 2.2 Summary of five 65nm sub-threshold designs

T1

Gate
number
168

Path
number
75,383

T2

496

5830

248

T3

546

916,719

311

T4

892

729,045

460

T5

1,269

462,140

379

T6

3,513

685,908

-

Design

Rank
122

The pass rate and standby power are compared among the three methods in the six
designs for different Vth variations (σ/μ), and the results are shown in Table 2.3. Different
Vth variations are used to report meaningful pass rates as the designs are of different
sizes. For the adaptive filtering method and the weighted delay method, the percentage of
gates selected for body biasing is also reported. The number of iterations used in the
adaptive filtering method is between 5,000 and 6,000. According to the results in this
table, compared with the all body biasing method which always achieves 100% pass rate ,
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the adaptive filtering method reduces the standby power by 86% at the cost of 20% pass
rate loss on average. On the other hand, compared with the weighted delay method, the
adaptive filtering method increases the pass rate by up to 57% with the similar standby
power. Also, the number of gates selected for body biasing only constitutes a small
percentage of the total gates, which verifies the sparsity assumption in Section 2.4.
Design T2 is then used to study the relationship between pass rate and Vth
variation for the three methods shown in Figure 2.7. The adaptive filtering approach is
stopped after 6,000 iterations. 97 out of 496 gates are selected by the adaptive filtering
approach and the weighted delay approach. As expected, the proposed adaptive filtering
method outperforms the weighted delay method significantly. But it is worse compared
with the all body biasing method, which is the cost paid to achieve the significant standby
power reduction. Note that the performance difference between APA-BA-PP and “All
body bias” can be further reduced by choosing more selected gates as studied later in
Figure 2.8.

Table 2.3 Comparison of pass rate among different approach
Standby Power (μW)

Pass rate
Design

Selected Gate
Percentage

σ/μ

All body
biasing

Weighted
delay

APABA-PP

All body
biasing

Weighted
delay

APABA-PP

APA-BA-PP/
Weighted delay

T1

0.04

100%

0%

80%

0.35

0.09

0.10

25.60%

T2

0.03

100%

8%

70%

0.86

0.17

0.15

18.71%

T3

0.06

100%

11%

78%

1.08

0.24

0.23

19.60%

T4

0.04

100%

10%

96%

1.70

0.31

0.30

17.26%

T5

0.07

100%

56%

84%

2.25

0.27

0.27

10.87%

T6

0.04

100%

12%

65%

6.35

1.64

1.61

20.00%
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Figure 2.7 Pass rate v.s. Vth variance comparison among different methods for T2.
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Figure 2.8 Pass rate and the percentage of gates selected v.s. iteration number for design
T2 with 10% Vth variance
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The same design is used again to demonstrate the relationship between the pass
rate/percentage of the total gates selected and the iteration number for the adaptive
filtering method. The results are depicted in Figure 2.8 for 10% Vth variance. As
mentioned earlier, the selected gate number will increase in each iteration to achieve
higher pass rate. This can be clearly observed in the figure. Interestingly, when the
iteration number increases over 6,000, a sharp increase in pass rate can be observed.
Therefore, it is necessary to try different numbers of iterations, and choose the most costefficient size for the target gate set.
Still using the same design, the impact from the representative path selection step
is studied. The pass rates from the adaptive filtering method with and without this step
are compared for different Vth variance, and the results are shown in Figure 2.9. From the
figure it can be seen that using representative paths can result in slightly lower pass rate
for the same Vth variation. But it results in drastic runtime reduction by reducing the
exponential path number to linear w.r.t. the gate number.
As mentioned in Section 2.3.3, the proposed algorithm deals with the
combinational circuits between registers, and for modern designs with millions of gates,
the number of gates will be in the range of thousands. In order to demonstrate the
scalability of the proposed scheme, the runtime of SVD, QR and APA-BA-PP are
separately reported for different cases in Table 2.4. It verifies that even for the largest
design T6 with 3,513 gates, the runtime is still acceptable.
Meanwhile, the impact of the number of representative paths r on the runtime and
the quality of the solution is very interesting. T5 is used here as an example, and the
runtimes of SVD and QR w.r.t. different r are shown in Figure 2.10. It is clear that the
runtime could be significantly decreased with smaller r. On the other hand, the impact of
r on pass rate is presented in Figure 2.11, which verifies that the pass rate loss could be
slight for r reduced from 379 (full rank) to 127 (10% of the gate number).
Finally, using Cadence encounter, the core layout of T2 is finished to study the
area overhead of the proposed algorithm.

The layout without body biasing is given in

Figure 2.12, and layout with selected body biasing is compared in Figure 2.13. Based on
the proposed APA-BA-PP, 97 out of 496 gates are selected in T2, and the total area
overhead is 0.8% compared with the original design without body biasing, which is really
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small (the size is labeled in the layout). Considering that the area overhead is from both
biasing gates and routing, the wire length overhead is also given to show the contribution
of different parts. The total wire length is 3,387 um for the design without body biasing,
and 3,447 um for the design with body biasing, a 2% overhead.
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Figure 2.9 The impact of representative path selection on pass rate at different Vth
variance for design T2.

Table 2.4 The runtime of SVD, QR and APA-BA-PP v.s. gate number for design T1-T6
Runtime (mins)

Desig
n

r

T1

122

0.91

0.58

APA-BAPP
7.23

T2

248

0.34

0.15

17.72

T3

311

65.37

40.28

34.99

T4

460

111.72

63.35

47.01

T5

254

21.18

13.19

75.04

T6

702

228.05

129.52

140.01

SVD

QR
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Figure 2.10 The impact of r on runtime for design T5.
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Figure 2.11 The impact of r on pass rate for design T5.
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Figure 2.12 Layout of T2 without body biasing.

Figure 2.13 Layout of T2 with body biasing gates selected by APA-BA-PP
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2.6. CONCLUSION
In this project, the problem of body biasing for sub-threshold designs with one
body biasing voltage domain and one body biasing voltage level is formulated firstly. It is
demonstrated that the problem can be modeled as a linearly constrained statistical sparse
optimization problem, and the adaptive filtering concept from the signal processing
community is borrowed to develop an efficient algorithm to solve it. Experimental results
on industrial designs using 65nm sub-threshold library suggest that compared with the
weighted delay approach, the proposed approach can improve the pass rate by 57% on
average with similar standby power and the same number of body biasing gates.
Compared with the approach to bias all the gates, the proposed approach can reduce the
standby power by 84% on average with 20% pass rate loss.
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3. PART I: SELECTIVE BODY BIASING FOR POST-SILICON TUNING OF
SUB-THRESHOLD DESIGNS: A SEMI-INFINITE PROGRAMMING
APPROACH WITH INCREMENTAL HYPERCUBIC SAMPLING
3.1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
A practical selective body biasing scheme, with only one body biasing voltage
domain to fix the timing violation, is proposed in Section 2. However, though the
formulated problem used uncertain constraints with probability distribution, the proposed
adaptive algorithm does not explicitly prioritize the constraints with larger probability
(i.e., constraints that are more likely to occur). In addition, the power optimization was
achieved with power penalty heuristic, and the integer constraints in the formulation were
conquered by the binary attractor heuristic. These heuristics lack theoretical justification
and have no guaranteed convergence rate. All these issues will significantly degrade the
performance of the algorithm.
The interesting fact is noticed that the problem of selective body biasing with
single biasing voltage domain can be formulated alternatively as a linear semi-infinite
programming (LSIP) problem. In addition, the structure of the problem, associated with
the physical meaning of the design, can lead to a novel Incremental Hypercubic Sampling
(IHCS) algorithm. The algorithm solves the LSIP problem through a number of finite
mixed-integer linear programming. Finally, many nice properties of the algorithm is
demonstrated through rigid mathematical derivations. Experimental results on industrial
designs using 65nm sub-threshold library demonstrate that, compared with the state-ofart adaptive filtering approach in Section 2, the IHCS approach can improve the pass rate
by up to 7.3x with a speed up to 4.1x, using the same number of body biasing gates with
about the same power consumption.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows: Section 3.2 gives the new
LSIP problem formulation. The proposed IHCS algorithm is presented in Section 3.3.
The experimental results are demonstrated in Section 3.4 and concluding remarks are
given in Section 3.5.

3.2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, an alternative formulation for the problem of selective body biasi-
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-ng with only one biasing voltage domain is shown, which will lead to a novel and
efficient algorithm.
This section is started by defining the notations necessary for the discussion.
Following the delay model in Section 2, all gates are simplified as a simple pull-up or
pull-down transistor or appropriate driving strength, and only the worst case falling and
rising time is considered. The gate delay is given here again in the following (3.1) for
convenience, which is exponential with a single Gaussian distributed random variable
Vth.
Vdd

Vth

Vth

1
1  VT VT
td  CsVdd
e
e   e VT ,
2
Is0

(3.1)

where  is the delay factor and Cs is the switching load capacitance. Vdd is the supply
voltage and Vth is the threshold voltage. VT is the thermal voltage and  is the subthreshold swing parameter. The constant  can be obtained by using HSPICE to measure
the gate delay at typical Vth.
The threshold with body biasing can be calculated as

Vth  Vth 0   ( | 2s  VSB |  | 2s |),

(3.2)

where both  (the body biasing coefficient) and  s (the surface potential) are obtained
from the technology library [12]. VSB is the body biasing voltage, and Vth 0 (the threshold
voltage for VSB  0 ) is a random variable due to the process variation.
The gate threshold voltage vector Vth is defined as Vth1 ,Vth 2 ,

,VthN  , which is

multivariate Gaussian random vector. The threshold voltage mean value is defined as
Vth01N, where 1N is N 1 vector of all ones.
The delay improvement matrix A tt ' is formulated as

Att '  Adiag t ' t ''.

(3.3)

where matrix A with M rows and N columns is used to represent the connection
information of design. Each row represents a path, and each column represents a gate. If
n-th gate appears in m-th path, the element at the m-th row and n-th column of the matrix
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A (i.e. A m,n ) is set to 1, otherwise it is set to 0. t' , and t'' are two N 1 vectors, and each
element represents the gate’s delay t' and t'' in different scenarios:


t' is the gate delay with only Vth variation



t'' is the gate delay with both Vth variation and body biasing

Both the delay vectors t' , and t'' are lognormal distribution [4].
Furthermore, considering the path number can have an exponential relationship
with the gate number, a representative path selection stage was employed in Section 2, in
which the number of representative paths does not exceed the number of gates.
Therefore, the matrix A is replaced with the must smaller representative path matrix A r .
The same technique in this section is adopted.
Meanwhile, a vector b ( M 1 ) is defined as

b  At ' TI M ,

(3.4)

where T is the target delay of the circuit. Considering t' is the delay vector with process
variation, vector b is the required delay improvement vector under process variation.
Based on the above definitions, constraint Att ' x  b is gotten, which represents
component-wise inequality, am,tt ' x  bm , m  1...M , where a m,tt ' is the mth row of A tt ' ,
and b m is the mth element of b ). The constraint means the overall delay improvement
for paths must be larger than the required delay improvement vector b . This constraint
cannot be satisfied for the entire variation space of Vth, and this problem is solved by
adding a penalty term in the objective function in Section 2.
Here, an alternative formulation of (2.10) is explored, by specifying the variation
space of Vth that the constraints need to be satisfied, i.e.,
min
subject to

 pb  p  x
Att ' x  b, Vth  .

(3.5)

in of decision variables is finite (i.e. N), while the constraints are infinite, which the
number due to the fact that they include a linear combination of N lognormal distributed
random variables. The variation space  has a direct impact on the number of gates
selected as well as the pass rate and needs to be provided by the designer. In this
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dissertation,   3 is used here to define the boundary  . Since the number of
constraints is infinite (Vth can be any value in  ), the above formulation is in essence a
linear semi-infinite programming (LSIP).
Typical methods to solve LSIP problem include stochastic approach, fuzzy
approach, interval approach, robust approach and parametric approach, etc. [33]. The
stochastic approach is difficult to apply here because the dimension of random variables
in this problem is very high, which makes the empirical distribution is impossible to get.
The robust approach cannot be used due to the fact that it is based on the uncertain set as
mentioned in [33]. As such, it is imperative to devise a new method to solve the problem,
which will be detailed in the following Section 3.3.

3.3. PROPOSED IHCS ALGORITHM
In this section, an efficient algorithm will be proposed to solve the LSIP problem
(3.5) using a novel concept of Incremental Hypercubic Sampling (IHCS) approach
specially tailored to the problem structure.
The algorithm is inspired by the observation that in the Vth variation space  ,
those scenarios (constraints) with smaller variation should be satisfied with higher
priority, as they have higher probability to occur. Accordingly, it is very interesting to
devise an iterative algorithm that handles constraints with smaller Vth variations first. The
linear programming (LP) problem is considered first
min
subject to

 pb  p  x
ˆ x - bˆ   1 .
A
tt '
N

(3.6)

where Â tt ' and b̂ in the constraint are a sample of the LSIP problem (3.5) with threshold
vector Vth0, and  is the timing margin which is positive and less than the timing
constraint T . The following assumptions for the selective body biasing problem are
gotten:
Assumption 1. There exists a small positive number  that the linear
programming problem in (3.6) is solvable for any Vth within hypercube centered at mean
threshold vector with side length 2  3 .
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It has been shown in section 2 that, the timing benefit brought by body biasing for
a single gate in the sub-threshold regime can cancel its own delay increment in the worstcase scenario under variation with 3σ/μ = 10%. Here, it is demonstrated that this
assumption 1 is reasonable using a commercial 65nm library as an example. The
parameters of 65nm library are listed in Table 3.1.
Consider the threshold with body biasing in (3.3), and the body biasing voltage is
400 mV, substitute the parameters in Table 3.1 and the 400 mV (0.4 V) body biasing
voltage into (3.3), and the change in the threshold voltage caused by body biasing is:
Vth ,body   ( | 2s  VSB |  | 2s |)
 0.3757  ( | 2  0.8016  0.4 |  2  0.8016)

(3.7)

 0.0560

Meanwhile, the maximum threshold voltage variation is

Vth,max  3 = 0.1 = 0.1Vth0,  0.05610.

(3.8)

Therefore, there is Vth,body  Vth,max  0 , which means the threshold voltage
changes can cancel the maximum threshold voltage variation with margin. Therefore,
even for maximum threshold voltage variation (   3 ), the solution with all ones can
make sure Att ' x  b . Therefore, Assumption 1 will hold for this 65nm library.
Assumption 1 will be workable for other libraries by setting suitable body biasing voltage
VSB .

Table 3.1 Parameters of 65nm library
parameters

Vth0,



φs

NMOS

0.5610

0.3757

-0.8016

PMOS

-0.5330

-0.4046

0.8016
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Based on Assumption 1, the following Theorem 1is gotten:
Theorem 1. There exists a small Vth hypercube centered at Vth0 with side 2Vth
that the solution x0 of the tighter problem (3.6) can satisfy the constraints Att ' x  b for any
Vth within the small hypercube.
Proof:
Considering the definitions of t' and t'' ,

 VVth1
t'   1 e T ,

 VV'th1
t''   1 e T ,


, N e

VthN
VT

, N e


,


V 'thN
VT

(3.9)


,


(3.10)

where Vthi is threshold voltage with process variation for i-th gate, and V 'thi is threshold
voltage with both process variation and body biasing for i-th gate. Therefore,

Att '  Adiag t ' t ''
   Vth1
 Adiag    1 e VT ,
  

, N e

VthN
VT

  VV'th1
   1 e T ,
 

, N e

V 'thN
VT

  

  

(3.11)

and

 VVth1
b  t ' T 1N   1 e T  T ,


, N e

VthN
VT


T 


(3.12)

where T is the target timing constraint of the design.
Solution x0 is obtained by solving LP problem (3.6), which means

Att ' x0  b   1N
and substitute (3.11) and (3.12) into (3.13),(3.14) is gotten

(3.13)
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   Vth1
Adiag    1 e VT ,
  
 VVth1
  1 e T  T ,


, N e

, N e

VthN
VT

VthN
VT

  VV'th1
   1 e T ,
 

, N e

V 'thN
VT

  
   x0
  

(3.14)


 T    1N .


Now considering a hypercube space centered at Vth  Vth1 ,Vth 2 ,

,VthN  with size

length 2Vth , and on its vertices, the solution x0 in (3.6) should satisfy the constraint

A'tt ' x0 - b'  0.

(3.15)

in which
   Vth1Vth

A'tt '  Adiag    1 e VT ,


 

, N e

VthN Vth

VT

  V 'th1 Vth
   1 e VT ,
 

, N e

V 'thN Vth
VT



   (3.16)
  


and
Vth
 Vth1
VT
b'   1 e
T,


, N e

VthN Vth
VT


T 


(3.17)

Therefore, substituting (3.16) and (3.18) into (3.15), and after several
straightforward mathematical operations, (3.18) is gotten

e

Vth
VT

e

   Vth1
Adiag    1 e VT ,
  

Vth
VT


 1 e


Vth1
VT

T,

, N e

, N e

VthN
VT

VthN
VT

  VV'th1
   1 e T ,
 


T   e


Vth
VT

, N e

V 'thN
VT

  
   x0
  

(3.18)

T 1N  T 1N  0

Considering (3.11)-(3.12), (3.18) can be rewritten as

e

Vth
VT

 Att ' x0 - b   e

Vth
VT

T 1N  T 1N  0.

(3.19)
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e

Vth
VT

 Att ' x0 - b   e
Vth

VT

Att ' x0 - b  T e

Vth
VT

T 1N  T 1N

 VVth 
 e T  1 1N





(3.20)

It is already known that Att ' x0 - b   1N , and in order to satisfy (3.20), Vth
should satisfies

 T e

Vth

VT

 VVth 
 e T  1





(3.21)

It should be noted that (3.21) stands for the following four equations:

 e

 e

 VVth 
 e T  1 T





(3.22)

 VVth 
 e T  1 T





(3.23)

 VVth 
 e T  1 T





(3.24)

 VVth 
 e T  1 T





(3.25)

Vth
VT

Vth
VT

 e

 e

Vth
VT

Vth
VT

Solving (3.22)-(3.23), the required range of Vth can be gotten as


1
1  
  
0, VT ln  
2
4
T  



(3.26)

Solving (3.24)-(3.25), another range requirement of Vth can be gotten as


 T 
0, VT ln  T    




Considering both (3.26) and (3.27), the allowed maximum value of Vth is

(3.27)
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1
1  
Vth  VT ln  
 
4 T 
2

(3.28)

This ends the proof of Theorem 1.
A lot of interesting facts can be observed from Theorem 1. The maximum side
length 2Vth of the hypercube is related with both the target timing constraint T , and the
timing margin  according to (29). Therefore, the normalized timing margin is defined
as  T . Meanwhile, the normalized side length with threshold voltage is defined as step
size, i.e. 2 VT Vth 0, . For a commercial 65nm technology, the relation between the stepsize 2 VT Vth 0, and the normalized time margin  T is plotted in Figure 3.1. It can be
observed that the hypercube is monotonically increasing with the normalized timing
margin, which is intuitive. Meanwhile, according to Assumption 1, Vth should also be
limited by 3 too (i.e. 2 VT Vth 0,  0.1 ).
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Figure 3.1 Relation between the step size 2 VT Vth 0, and the normalized time margin

 T.

44
Finally, based on Theorem 1, the following corollaries are derived easily:
Corollary 1. There exist a minimum spacing r between the samples to cover the
entire   3 variation space.
Corollary 2. There exist a finite number of samples to cover the entire   3
variation space.
The corollaries pave the road for the IHCS algorithm, which is summarized in
Algorithm 1. The algorithm samples Vth on an incrementally increased hypercubic
surface, and for each sample Vˆth , and calculate the corresponding Âtt ' and b̂ according to
(3.3) and (3.4). The following ILP problem will be solved
min
subject to

 pb  p  x
ˆ x  bˆ   1
A
tt '
N

(3.29)

Assume the solution of (3.29) is x0 , and the selected gates for each sample are
combined together. In the next iteration, the elements in x corresponding to the gates
selected in all previous iterations will be set to 1. Since the surface area of the hypercube
increases in each iteration, an increased number of samples are used in each iteration. In
addition, to reduce computation complexity, only a small number of samples will be used
which may not be enough to cover the entire surface. In the experiments, it is found that
setting step size as   0.01 and the number of samples as N  2i (where i is the
iteration number) offers a good balance between runtime and solution quality. Moreover,
from the corollaries as long as in each iteration the surface with a step size  is
expanded, the entire variation space can be covered. The iterations will be stopped when
the threshold specified by the designer is reached (if it is smaller than   3 ) or more
gates than predefined parameter K have been selected as body biasing.
Apparently, the algorithm has the benefit that scenarios with smaller variations
are covered with higher priority (in earlier iterations). This should lead to significantly
improved pass rate, as will be validated in experimental results. Meanwhile, it is
straightforward to have the following Theorem 2:
Theorem 2. The pass rate increases monotonically with the number of iterations in
IHCS.
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Algorithm 1: Incremental Hypercubic Sampling (IHCS)
Initial: Set all elements of x s to be zeros; i  1,  0   ;
Loop: for (  =  0 ;    0  0.1;     )
a.1

Loop: for (j = 1; j  ni ; j  j  1)
Sample Vth , j on the surface of hypercube
centered at Vth 0 with side length 2  0   i  1  
Get the optimal solution x j by solving (3.29)
End Loop

a.2

Merge all ones in solutions x1 , x2 ,..., xni to
form a new vector xsi

a.3

i  i 1

a.4

Update the elements of x s to be ones
according to the solution xsi .

a.5

if ( xs 0  K ) exit; else goto a.1

Output: Final solution xs

The proof is trivial considering the fact that each iteration keeps the gates already
selected and adds more gates for body biasing.
Finally, a single path with two gates as a simple two-dimensional example is used
to illustrate the IHCS algorithm. In this example there are only two random variables V th1
and Vth2. The variation space of Vth1 and Vth2 is shown as Figure 3.2 (a), in which the
origin of coordinate has been relocated at (Vth1,Vth2). Then a few Vth on the square with
side 2 is randomly sampled. By solving the related ILP problems and merging the
solutions, the area surrounded by the square will be covered, as shown in Figure 3.2 (b).
Then the side of the square is expanded to 4 , and sampled on the new surface. After
solving the related ILP problems and merging the solution, the area surrounded by the
expanded square is covered as shown in Figure 3.2 (d). This process continues until the
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required variance specified by the designer is covered or too many gates have been
selected as body biasing.
It should be noted that, even though the power overhead is still used as the
minimization target as Section 2. It is straightforward to extend the proposed IHCS
approach to take into account other optimization targets, such as the layout and routing
overhead, etc. It is only necessary to modify the optimization targets of the ILP.

v2

v2

v1

(a)

v1

(b)

v2

v2

v1

(c)

v1

(d)

Figure 3.2 A two-dimension example of proposed IHCS algorithm workflow

3.4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The proposed IHCS algorithm is implemented and the APA-BA-PP algorithm in
MATLAB. The simulations were performed based on six 65 nm industrial sub-threshold
designs as listed in Table 3.2, which includes the path number, gate number along with
the rank of matrix A (the number of representative paths) for each design. The supply
voltage is 200 mV, and the body biasing voltage is set to -400 mV for PMOS and 400
mV for NMOS. The body biasing voltage is selected so that when all the gates are biased,
93% pass rate can be achieved for Vth variance less than 5%. All pass rates reported in
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this section were obtained through 10K Monte Carlo simulations. In each simulation, it
works only if all the paths satisfy the target delay, otherwise it fails. The pass rate is
defined as the percentage of Monte Carlo samples without timing violations out of the
10K samples. The experiments were conducted on a workstation equipped with quadcore 2.4 GHz CPU and 96 GB RAM.

Table 3.2 Summary of six 65 nm sub-threshold designs
Design

Gate number

Path number

Rank

T1

168

75,383

122

T2

496

5830

248

T3

546

916,719

311

T4

892

729,045

460

T5

1,269

462,140

379

T6

3,513

685,908

-

Firstly, the pass rate is compared and standby power of the proposed IHCS
algorithm with all body biasing and APA-BA-PP algorithm in section 2 for all six test
cases. For fair comparison, the pass rate is compared under the same selected gate
percentage, and the results are shown in Table 3.3. Different Vth variations are used to
report meaningful pass rates as the designs are of different sizes. The percentage of gates
selected for body biasing is also reported for both APA-BA-PP and IHCS algorithm.
According to the data in Table 3.3, all body biasing always achieve 100% pass rate, but
with much higher power consumption compared with APA-BA-PP and IHCS algorithm.
Meanwhile, compared with APA-BA-PP, the proposed IHCS algorithm has up to 82%
pass rate improvement, which means that IHCS achieves better performance (pass rate).
The runtime comparison between the proposed IHCS algorithm and APA-BA-PP
is shown in Table 3.4. According to the table, IHCS algorithm can improve the runtime
up to 2x on average compared with APA-BA-PP. The only case where IHCS requires
longer runtime is Design T1. This is probably because the proposed algorithm has not
been optimized for small designs, where the number of samples can be reduced.
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Table 3.3 Comparison of pass rate among different approach
Standby Power (μW)

Pass rate
design
σ/μ

All body
biasing

APA-BAPP

SIPIHCS

All body
biasing

APA-BAPP

SIPIHCS

Selected Gate
Percentage
SIP-IHCS
/APA-BA-PP

T1

0.04

100%

45%

79%

0.35

0.09

0.09

19.64%

T2

0.05

100%

30%

93%

0.86

0.18

0.18

21.17%

T3

0.03

100%

96%

96%

1.08

0.29

0.29

26.73%

T4

0.04

100%

39%

55%

1.70

0.23

0.23

13.34%

T5

0.06

100%

86%

86%

2.25

0.22

0.22

8.06%

T6

0.03

100%

13%

95%

6.35

1.06

1.06

16.43%

Table 3.4 The runtime of APA-BA-PP and IHCS for designs T1-T6
Design

Runtime (mins)
APA-BA-PP

IHCS

T1

7.23 (1)

13.90 1/(0.5X)

T2

17.72 (1)

17.64 (1/1.0X)

T3

34.99 (1)

13.67 (1/2.6X)

T4

47.01 (1)

17.03(1/2.8X)

T5

75.04 (1)

17.99(1/4.1X)

T6

140.01 (1)

139.00(1/1.0X)

According to Theorem 1, the step size of Vth will impact the final solution
drastically, and design T2 is used to verify the effect of step size on pass rate. The result
is shown in Figure 3.3. From the figure, it is clear that the pass rate reduces with the
increase of step size. This is intuitively in accordance with Corollaries 1 and 2: with too
big of a step size, the solutions from the samples on the expanded hybercubic surface are
not enough to cover the gap. On the other hand, the runtime also increases rapidly as the
step size decreases. It is found that setting the step size to 0.01, which has been used
throughout the experiments, offers a good balance between runtime and pass rate.
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Figure 3.3 The impact of step size on pass rate at different Vth variance for design T2.

Then, the same design T2 is used to demonstrate the relationship between the pass
rate and the number of samples used in each iteration, which is shown in Figure. 3.4.
From the figure it is seen that the pass rate improves as more samples are taken in each
iteration, which is as expected. The increase of the sample number on the other hand has
a negative impact on runtime, and in the experiments it is figured out that setting the
number of samples to be N  2i offers a good balance between runtime and pass rate.
Finally, using Cadence encounter, the core layout of T2 with selected body
biasing is given in Figure 3.5 to study the area overhead of the proposed algorithm.
Based on the proposed IHSC, 105 out of 496 gates are selected in T2, and the total area
overhead is 0.9% compared with the original design without body biasing, which is really
small (the size is labeled in the layout). Considering that the area overhead is from both
biasing gates and routing, the wire length overhead is also given to show the contribution
of different parts. The total wire length is 3,387 um for the design without body biasing,
and 3,703 um for the design with body biasing, a 2% overhead.
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Figure 3.4 The impact of sample numbers in each iteration on pass rate at different Vth
variance for design T2.

Figure 3.5 Layout of design T2 with body biasing.
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3.5. CONCLUSIONS
In this Section, the selective body biasing problem for sub-threshold designs is
reformulated as an SIP problem. Then an efficient algorithm based on the novel concept
of Incremental Hypercubic Sampling (IHCS), specially tailored to the problem structure,
is proposed along with the convergence analysis. Compared with the state-of-the-art
approach based on adaptive filtering, experimental results on industrial designs using
65nm sub-threshold library demonstrate that the proposed approach can improve the pass
rate by up to 7.3x with a speedup to 4.1x, using the same number of body biasing gates
with about the same power consumption.
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4. PART II: ON RANDOM DYNAMIC VOLTAGE SCALING IN
CORRELATION POWER ANALYSIS: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH
With the massive deployment of mobile devices and sensor networks, the demand
of low powered devices with high security becomes more and more urgent. RDVS
technology is a very efficient method to improve the resistance of cryptosystem against
side-channel attacks. In this section, it is demonstrated that the resistance can be
undermined by providing lower off-chip power supply voltage. In order to address this
issue, the following method is proposed in this dissertation. The off-chip power supply
voltage will be monitored, and an alarm could be triggered to protect valued information
once the power supply voltage is lower than the expected voltage (threshold voltage).
However, considering the maintenance cost and the environment noise on power supply
voltage, this problem is further formulated as a non-zero sum game model, and the
attacker and the circuit supplier (defender) are the players of this game. The analysis of
the Nash equilibrium in this game shed light on the choice of the optimal threshold
voltage based on parameters of cryptosystem including the value of information, denialof-service cost, etc.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows: Section 4.1 introduces the
basic background and motivation, and Section 4.2 reviews cryptography and CPA,
together with the motivation of the proposed game theoretic approach. Section 4.3 details
the proposed game theoretic approach and Section 4.4 presents the experimental results.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 4.5.

4.1. INTRODUCTION
With the massive development of mobile devices like phones and tablets as well
as sensor networks for civil and military applications, securing cryptographic device
against SCA has become a very hot research topic in recent years. One of the most
popular cryptographic devices used in these security sensitive devices is the smart card,
which provides the security identification and authentication for those applications. How
to secure these cryptographic devices from various attacks has grown to become an active
research topic recently.
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Conventional security measures employ various cryptographic algorithms,
including Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Data Encryption Standard (DES) [34]
[35], RSA (named after its inventors Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) [36]-[38] and Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) [39] [40]. Theoretically, those algorithms shall provide
strong resistance against cyber attacks. However, when they are implemented in
hardware, side-channel attackers can still get the correct key easily.
One early example of side-channel attack is the DPA [41], which computes a
differential trace based on a hypothesis of the secret key to manifest the points where the
key bits were manipulated. It can directly reveal the private key or significantly narrow
down the key search space. DPA later evolved and the CPA was developed. With details
reviewed in Section 4.2.1, CPA is more efficient and effective compared with DPA.
The only way to resist side-channel attack is to enhance hardware implementation
and reduce power peaks and correlations. Various works exist in this regard [42]-[45].
However, most of them are deterministic in nature. In other words, the same plaintext
always results in the same power trace under a given key. Accordingly, attackers can still
repeat the same pattern multiple times to accumulate small deviations in power traces to
assist the attack.
An early attempt to address this issue through random precharging was discussed
in [46], which is still not completely secure against DPA. Random Dynamic Voltage and
Frequency Scaling (RDVFS) as a countermeasure was proposed in [47], which did
enhance the resistance of the cryptosystem to power attacks. It is later demonstrated in
[48] that RDVS alone provides better resistance against DPA, and the evaluation about
the effectiveness of RDVS against CPA was given in [49].
However, according to the analysis given below, the attacker can improve the
performance of power analysis by providing lower power supply voltage to RDVS
cryptosystem.
The following Figure 4.1 (a) and Figure 4.1 (b) demonstrate the impact of scaling
range on CPA resistance. In Figure 4.1, the X-axis represents the indices of the power
trace samples, and the Y-axis represents the correlation coefficients of each hypothetical
key. The correct key is plotted in black, and all other keys are plotted in grey. For CPA,
the instantaneous power consumption during the DATA transitions is the most important
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information, which means the highest correlation peaks happen at the data transition.
Therefore, if the correlation coefficients of the correct key (black) are higher than those
of other keys (grey) at this time, CPA is successful. It can be observed that that larger
scaling range in RDVS can improve the CPA resistance. In contrast, lower voltage
scaling range decreases the resistance of system to power attack. Therefore, this allows
the possibility that the attacker can decrease the voltage scaling range by manipulating
the DC-DC converters in order to facilitate the success of CPA.
For many DC-DC converters including the switched-capacitor DC-DC buck
converters, and inductive buck converter , there exist a linear relationship between output
and input, and it will be demonstrated that lower supply voltage to DC-DC converters
will give smaller output voltage range (i.e. smaller scaling voltage range in RDVS) in
Section 4.2.2. Therefore, the attackers can retrieve the secret key of the system more
quickly by using lower attack power supply. In order to improve the resistance to CPA of
RDVS cryptosystem under low supply voltage, the following method is proposed in this
dissertation. Firstly, the off-chip power supply voltage will be monitored, and an alarm
could be triggered to protect valued information once the power supply voltage is lower
than the expect
In theory, larger threshold voltage could help filtering the power attacks, however,
normal changes on supply voltage caused by noise may be also taken as power attacks,
which will cause loss of defenders. In fact, either for the defender or the attacker, both the
threshold voltage and the attack power supply voltage impact their gain or loss. The
strategy of the defender is to take different threshold voltages and corresponding strategy
of the attacker is to use different attack power supply voltages. The problem between the
attacker and the defender can be formulated as a game, and it is very interesting to figure
out the optimal strategy for both the defender and the attacker. Therefore, in this paper, a
game theoretic approach is proposed to analyze the problem between the attacker and the
defender in RDVS power attack resistant cryptosystem.

4.2. PRELIMINARIES
With the massive development of mobile devices like phones and tablets as well
as sensor networks for civil and military applications, securing cryptographic device
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Figure 4.1 CPA result with Temporal DVS (a) 1.8/1.5V Temporal DVS. (b) 1.8/1.2V
Temporal DVS
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against SCA has become a very hot research topic in recent years. One of the most
popular cryptographic devices used in these security sensitive devices is the smart card,
which provides the security identification and authentication for those applications. How
to secure these cryptographic devices from various attacks has grown to become an active
research topic recently.
4.2.1. Cryptographic System and CPA. Symmetric key ciphers have simpler
and faster encryption and decryption processes. However, because of their shared key
policy, they are more prone to attacks. Hence, generally keys are distributed between two
channels using more secured and computationally intensive asymmetric key ciphers, and
information is shared using symmetric key ciphers. AES and DES are some of the wellknown symmetric key ciphers. The best known asymmetric ciphers include RSA and
ECC.
CPA is a more effective attacking method compared with DPA [50]. It analyzes
the correlative relationship between the plaintext/cipher-text and instantaneous power
consumption of the cryptographic device. In order to do CPA attack, a power model (e.g.
Hamming Weight (HW) model) [54] needs to be built to predict the power consumption
in terms of hypothetical keys and input/output data; then, the predicted power is
compared with the measured power using a Person correlation coefficient algorithm [51].
If CPA is successful, the correlation coefficients between the predicted power and the
measured power will be significantly higher when the hypothetical key is the secret key
[52].
4.2.2. Design Description. In the previous work [49] [52], an AES S-Box in
VHDL has been designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of RDVS. Here, this S-Box is
used again as the vehicle to verify the proposed game theoretic approach in this paper.
The designed S-Box is synthesized in Xilinx ISE EDA tool, and is downloaded on an
evaluation FPGA board (SASEBO-GII), which is designed and developed for the purpose
of side-channel attack experiments by the Research Center for Information Security
(RCIS) in Tokyo, Japan [53].
By measuring the voltage across a shunt resistor of the FPGA board, the current
of the FPGA can be gotten. By multiplying it with the core voltage of the FPGA, the
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power consumption can be obtained. Such an approach improves the efficiency to obtain
realistic data compared with software simulation.
The collected power data, measured under constant supply voltage, is then
processed through MATLAB to include the RDVS based on the common knowledge that
power scales quadratically with the supply voltage [54]. This mimics the real S-Box
design with RDVS. The supply voltage is chosen randomly from a number of pre-set
voltages, which can either be provided externally or obtained through on-chip DC-DC
converters, based on a random number generator (RNG).
4.2.2.1 RDVS System. The RDVS Cryptosystem diagram is shown in Figure
4.2, where the power gird of the system is chosen randomly from four different power
grids according to the RNG. The source of power grids are outputs of DC-DC converters
and off-chip power supply, and the simplest switched-capacitor DC-DC converter is the
best choice in this application considering the balance between cost and performance.

Random
Number
Generator

Decoder

S-Box

sel

sel
Vdd1

Vdd1
mux
Vdd2

Vdd2

DC-DC
DC-DC
converter converter

Off chip power supply
(Vdd)
Figure 4.2 System diagram of RDVS S-Box.

4.2.2.2 Random number generator. To implement RNG, a simple Linear
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) counter [55] is explored here, which is easy to
implement with standard cell libraries in real circuits. The simulation result is shown in
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Figure 4.3, where the period of pseudo random number generated is 256. More shift
registers can provide stronger randomness, but at the cost of area overhead. On the other
side, for some applications such as smart cards, RNGs with stronger randomness may be
readily available and can be directly utilized. In previous experiments, it has been
demonstrated that stronger randomness can significantly improve CPA resistance [48].
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Figure 4.3 Part of the random number generator cycles of LSFR.

4.2.2.3 DC-DC converter. There are a lot of linear DC-DC converters. and here
the DC-DC converter from [57] is chosen, which is shown in Figure 4.4. There are two
DC-DC converters in the system, and they share the same structure with different
resistors and inductors to obtain different output voltages. The relationship between the
output voltage and input voltage is linear for this DC-DC converter [57], therefore, it is
proved that the voltage range decreases by providing lower power supply voltage (input
voltage of the DC-DC converters). Therefore, the following (4.1) can be gotten as:
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Vdd1 Vdd1 '

a
Vdd
Vdd '
Vdd 2 Vdd 2 '

b
Vdd
Vdd '

(4.1)

a  b  1
,

Vdd  Vdd '

where, Vdd

is the normal power supply voltage and the input voltage of DC-DC

converter, and Vdd1 and Vdd2 are the outputs of DC-DC converter under Vdd . Vdd ' is the
lower power supply voltage used by the attacker, and Vdd1 ' and Vdd2 ' are the
corresponding output voltage of DC-DC converter. a and b are the coefficients of DCDC converter, which are smaller than 1. Then the voltage range of RDVS S-box can be
gotten, which shows that the lower power supply voltage Vdd ' leads to smaller voltage
range.

Vdd2  Vdd1  bVdd  aVdd  Vdd (b  a)
Vdd2 ' Vdd1 '  bVdd ' aVdd '  Vdd '(b  a)
Vdd  Vdd '

0  b  a
 Vdd (b  a)  Vdd '(b  a)
Vdd2  Vdd1  Vdd2 ' Vdd1 '

Figure 4.4 DC-DC converter

(4.2)
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4.2.2.4 Power supply voltage monitor. Considering the fact that the change of
power supply voltage will impact the gate delay, the power supply voltage can be
monitored by measuring the gate delay. The idea of critical-path monitor (CPM) is
borrowed here to monitor the change of gate delay, which was proposed to measures
critical path delay and the effects of noise and localized Vdd droops on delay in [59]. Due
to the fact that many timing paths may be critical, the CPM in [59] uses a small number
of delay paths with different delay versus process, voltage and temperature curves to
synthesize the critical paths. However, in this dissertation, only changes of power supply
voltage need to be monitored, and do not have to synthesize the critical path.
Therefore, a simplified power supply voltage monitor (PVM) is designed here
based on the structure of CPM, which has less power and area overhead. The block
diagram of VPM is shown in Figure 4.5, which is mainly composed of three parts: AND
path delay unit, edge detector and comparator. The minimum resolution of the edge
detector is one FO2 delay. The threshold voltage is coded to 6-bit, and will be the
reference input of the comparator. For the edge detector, taking the 1-to-0 transition of B
as an example, the outputs of inverters is (0)101010, where the first 0 in brackets is value
of B. When the rising edge of B arrives and just propagates the first two inverters, the
output of inverters is (1)011010. Therefore, the edge of B could be captured on the rising
edge of the clock and the code based on the position of edge of B is gotten after the
XOR/XNOR array, which indicates the AND path delay.

4.3. GAME MODEL AND ANALYSIS
Considering the fact that lower power supply voltage results in smaller scaling
range, which decreases the resistance of system to power attack [49], the attacker can
improve the efficiencies of attack by using a lower power supply voltage. In order to
verify this point, some experiments will be firstly presented. Figure 4.6 shows the CPA
analysis of the same RDVS S-Box system for 1.7v power supply and a lower 1.5v power
supply voltage. The X-axis represents the number of traces and Y-axis represents the
correlation value at the time of data transients. The correct key is plotted in black, and
other keys are plotted in grey. For the attack using 1.7v power supply, the correlation
coefficient of the correct key is buried by the correlation coefficient of other keys even
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Figure 4.5 Block diagram of the VPM and edge detector

the number of power traces achieves 4000, which means that CPA would fail. However,
for the attack using 1.5v power supply, the correct key stands out from other keys when
the number of traces is around 3500. Therefore, it demonstrates that lower power supply
voltage makes the attack easier, and it is very necessary for the defender to take this issue
into account when using DVS in cryptosystem.
In all, the problem can be summarized as below: the designer/user of
cryptosystem is the defender, and their purpose is to avoid information leakage in power
trace at lower attack voltage by monitoring the supply voltage. On the other side, the
attacker will try to get the secret key using CPA approach by decreasing the voltage
scaling range without triggering the alarm, and the gain of the attacker definitely is the
loss of the defender. Both the defender and the attacker are trying their best to maximize
their own gain. Therefore, the problem could be formulated as a non-cooperative game
between the attacker and the defender, and the following assumptions are given before
introducing the strategies of the attacker and the defender.
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Firstly, integrated DC-DC converters are widely employed to convert a single offchip voltage V0 to multiple on-chip voltages V1, V2, V3, etc. Meanwhile, as mentioned
in Section 4.2, the output of DC-DC converter is linear with the input. This assumption is
demonstrated both by simulation result in Section 4.2.2 and reference [34].
Furthermore, attackers are rare among all users, which is very reasonable in
practice. The attacker’s target is to retrieve the secret key of the S-Box, from which
he/she can gain access to valuable information of value F. Otherwise, if he fails to gain
the information, the gain of the attacker will be 0. It’s of the attacker’s interest to obtain
the secret key as quickly as possible, and the attacker will not give up until they get the
secret key. Here, the following behavior of the attacker is assumed, and it will not affect
the problem formulation and the game model. Firstly, the attacker will gather K power
traces, and then the attacker will try keys one by one following the order of correlation
coefficient since the top one key. Accordingly, the cost of attack is composed of two
parts, which is the cost of K power traces E and the cost of R from trying keys. Here,

E is the cost of gathering K power traces, R is the rank of correct key, and  is the
trying cost of per key.
Finally, it is assumed that the noise of power grid is additively Gaussian
distributed, with zero mean and known standard deviation, and the noise is long-time
noise. Therefore, the noise will not impact on attacker during the short time attacking.
However, it does impact on the defender, who needs to maintain the cryptosystem during
its lifetime.
Now, the description of the system could be summarized here. The defender built
a cryptosystem with RDVS to improve the resistance of cryptosystem to power analysis
attack (CPA in this paper). The cryptosystem is composed of RDVS S-Box, random
number generator and DC-DC converters, and the diagram of the system is shown in
Figure 4.2. On the other hand, the attacker prefers to attack the system using a lower offchip supply voltage, which reduces the voltage range of RDVS cryptosystem, and makes
the attack easier.
In summary, the defender’s strategy is: monitor the voltage coming from off-chip
and set the threshold to Si, Si is from a threshold sets S= {S1, S2, ..SN}. When the
voltage drops below Si, an alarm will be triggered and the secrete key and all information
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stored in the memory will be erased. However, the alarm can either be triggered by the
attacker, or due to environmental noise. When this happens, the chip needs to be returned
to the defender, who will then pick up another chip and reprogram a different secret key.
To avoid attackers from detecting the threshold Si through multiple trials, the threshold
needs to be randomly distributed among chips.
The attacker’s strategy is to use a lower off-chip voltage set V(V1, V2, …, VM),
and try different keys until the information is obtained. Assume that both the attacker and
the defender are rational, and the attacker will not stop until the secret key is gotten.
Because, the gain will be definitely negative if the attacker stops attacking, and it is very
possible that the secret key goes out in next trying.
The gain for attack and defender is defined respectively as below.
For the attacker, the following situations are defined:
1) Gain is G .
If the alarm of cryptosystem is triggered, it will cause maintenance cost of the
defender, and it is defined as the denial-of-service cost G , which is positive value. Under
this situation, the gain of attacker is G .
2) Gain is F  (E  R) .
If the alarm is not triggered, the attacker will not stop until the secret key is
gotten, and the cost of attack includes power trace measurement cost E and key trying
cost R . Therefore, the gain of attacker is F  (E  R) under this case.
NOTE 1: The probability of failed attack is zero. Failed attack is defined as, the
attacker does not get secret key and the effort has already be spent. That is because, if the
probability is not zero, which means that cryptosystem is strong enough to resist power
attack analysis.
NOTE 2: F is larger than G, otherwise it makes no sense to detect the attacker.
On the other hand, the gain for the defender is defined as:
1) DS1: Gain is G .
When alarm is triggered because of the attacker, it will result in the denial-ofservice cost to the defender, in the form of G .
2) DS2: Gain is PC .
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PC is the cost when the alarm is triggered due to the noise, where P

is the

probability of the alarm is triggered due to the noise, and C is the denial-of-service cost
if the system is down due to noise. Note, for defender, whatever the alarm is triggered by
attacker or the noise, the denial-of-service cost should be the same. Considering our
model is built between one attacker and the defender, the denial-of-service cost caused by
attacker just happen to one single device. However, the denial-of-service cost due to
noise could happen to all devices is the cryptosystem is network with multiple devices.
Therefore, C may be either G if the cryptosystem is a single device system or K  G
when the system is network, where is the number of components of the network. NOTE
3: Just as mentioned above, the noise of power grid is long-time noise, and it only
impacts the defender but not the attacker.
Both the attacker and the defender are rational. The attacker runs CPA analysis to
maximize the gain of attack, while the defender looks for optimal threshold voltage to
minimize their loss. Assume that the defined costs above are common knowledge
between the attacker and the defender. More precisely, both the attacker and the defender
share the following knowledge: Denial-of-service cost G , Value of information F and
Parameters of attacker’s cost E, .
Now, a simple example is used to show how the game theoretic approach works
in this section. Without loss of generality, assume the defender has two (N=2) different
threshold voltages, and

S  {S1 ,S2 }  {low, high}

(4.3)

The attacker also has 2 (M=2) different attack voltages

T  {T1 ,T2}  {low, high}.

(4.4)

According to the gain definition, the normal form of the game between the
attacker and the defender can be gotten in Table 4.1. For {T  low,S  low} , the attacker
voltage T1 equals to the threshold voltage S1, and the low supply voltage alarm will be
triggered. Therefore, the gain of attacker is G . On the other hand, the gain of defender is

G  Plow C , where Plow the probability of the alarm is triggered due to the noise under
low threshold voltage. For {T  low,S  high} , the attacker voltage T1 is smaller than
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the threshold voltage S1, which will trigger the low supply voltage alarm, too. The gain
of attacker is G , and the gain of defender is G  Phigh C , where Phigh is the probability of
the alarm is triggered due to the noise under high threshold voltage. For

{T  high,S  low} , the attacker voltage T2 is larger than the threshold voltage S1, and
the secret key could be gotten after K power traces are gathered. Under this situation, the
gain of attacker is F  (E  R) , and the corresponding gain of the defender is F  Plow C .
Just like {T  low,S  high} , same gain for attacker and defender can be gotten under

{T  high,S  high} .

Table 4.1 Normal form of the game
Defender
Attacker
Low
High

Low

High

G,

G,

G  Plow C

G  Phigh C

F  (E  R) ,

G,

F  Plow C

G  Phigh C

Note, this model still works when considering any other different sets S and T,
and M do not have to equal to N.
The Nash equilibria are gotten by analyzing the Table 4.1, and there are total three
different possible cases in this example.
Note, there is Plow  Phigh in Table II.
1). Case 1:
If G  F  (E  R) , it means that the denial-of-service cost is high, or the cost
attack is high. Under this case, the attacker will try to create denial of service, and the
gain of attacker G is maximized. Therefore, (low, low), (low, high) and (high, high) may
be Nash equilibria. On the other hand, the defender tries to avoid the denial of service due
to noise, and considering that Plow  Phigh , (low, low) is the Nash equilibria 1 (NE1).

67
2.) Case 2:
If G  F  (E  R) & F  Plow C  G  Phigh C , it may happen when the denial-ofservice cost is low or the cost per trial is low, and the information value is high. The
attacker tries to use a high supply voltage to guarantee the success of attack, and
considering F  Plow C  G  Phigh C , the defender also tries to use a low threshold
voltage to achieve the gain F  Plow C . Therefore, in this case, (high, low) is the Nash
equilibria 2 (NE2).
Note, for this case, the following conditions should be satisfied:
G  F  (E  R)
,

F  Plow C  G  Phigh C

 (Phigh  Plow )C  E  R,

(4.5)

(4.6)

which means only when parameters satisfy relationship of (6), it is possible to achieve
NE2.
3.) Case 3:
If F  Plow C  G  Phigh C , the defender will try to use high threshold voltage to
maximum the gain, then either (low, high) named as NE3 or (high, high) named as NE4
could be Nash equilibria.
Note, the condition of case 1 and case 3 may be true at the same time, which
means both NE1 and NE3/NE4 may be Nash equilibria for some cases. Therefore the
game model will be a mixed strategy game, and this will be proved in Section 4.4 using
the given example.

4.4. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Different applications and cryptosystems mean different parameters ( G,F,E, ,C ).
In order to observe the effect of different parameters on Nash equilibria, CPA
experiments are run based on analysis in Section 4.3.
In the CPA experiments, 1.8/1.5V RDVS S-box is used as the cryptosystem, and
simulations are run following the attacker behavior defined in Section 4.3.

In the
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experiments, 5000 power traces are gathered firstly following the way mentioned in
Section 4.2. Then the rank of secret key is gotten by sorting result of CPA analysis in
Matlab. The experimental results are summarized in Table 4.2, where T is the power
supply voltage using by the attacker. 1.8v is included here also as reference, and the rank
of 1.8v is 110, which is much larger than the rank using lower power supply voltage and
demonstrates the high efficiency of CPA using lower power supply. All following
experiments are using the values of R in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 Rank of secret key in CPA analysis to DVS S-box
T(v)

R (Rank of
secret key)

1.8

110

1.7

49

1.5

23

In order to observe the effect of each parameter on Nash equilibrium, the value of
parameters are chosen as shown in Table 4.3, which is obtained based on the S-box
system, and use 1.5v/1.7v as the low/high voltage. Each time, only one parameter is
changed and the rest of parameters are fixed to value in Table 4.3. Therefore, five
different experiments are done in the following Sub-section 4.4.1.

Table 4.3 Value of parameters
Parameter

Meaning of Parameter

Value

G

Denial-of-service cost

3

F

Value of information

5

C

Denial-of-service cost caused by noise

60

β

trying cost of per key

0.005

E

cost of 5000 power traces

0.5
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Furthermore, considering that the noise of power grid is additive with zero mean
Gaussian distribution, the value of P1.5 ( Plow ) and P1.7 ( Phigh ) can be gotten by setting the
standard deviation   0.05 , which is reasonable considering most of the noise will not
exceed [3*0.05v, 3*0.05v] , i.e. [0.15v, 0.15v] .

P1.5  0.00

(4.7)

P1.7  0.02

(4.8)

4.4.1. Mixed Nash Equilibrium Analysis. Substitute P1.5 , P1.7 , R in Table 4.2
and Table 4.3 into Table 4.1, it is verified that the game does not admit a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. If the defender chooses 1.5v as the threshold voltage to minimize the
loss under (1.5v, 1.5v), however the attacker will use 1.7v to achieve the maximum gain
under 1.5v threshold voltage, which makes the defender suffer more loss (-5). Therefore,
the defender then goes to 1.7v as the threshold voltage, and the Nash equilibria will be
either NE3 or NE4.
Two mixed strategy Nash equilibria are calculated by the game solver from [58]
that they are denoted as (5) and (6). The mixed-strategy Nash solution for the attacker is
shown in Figure 4.7, on the other hand, the defender just has one strategy (1.7v) as shown
in (5) and (6). In all the two possible Nash equilibria, the gain of the attacker is 3.0 while
the gain of the defender is -4.2.

{0.4(1.5)  0.6(1.7);1.0(1.7)}

(4.9)

{1.0(1.7);1.0(1.7)}

(4.10)

Ptobability of playing each pure strategy
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Attacker's Mixed Strategy Nash
Equilibrium
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

NE3/NE4
NE4

1.5v

1.7v

Attacker's pure strategies

Figure 4.7 Attacker’s mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

4.4.2. Effect of Parameters on Nash Equilibrium. Still using the same
parameters in Table 4.3, and above P1.5 , P1.7 , R

in Table 4.1, experiments are done to

observe the effect of parameters on Nash equilibrium. All following results are from
game solver in [58].
Taking G as the variable, and the other parameters as constant with values in
Table 4.3, Figure 4.8 is presented to show the Nash equilibria and gain of
attacker/defender v.s. G . According to Figure 4.8, the Nash equilibria will be NE1 when
increasing G , and NE1 will also be a possible Nash equilibria when  and E are
increased as shown in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10. This experimental result matches the
analysis about case 1 in Section 4.3, which means when denial-of-service cost or the cost
attack (  and E ) is high, and Nash equilibria is NE1. On the other hand, the gain of
attacker increases with G , in contrast the gain (loss) of the defender decreases (increases)
with G , which means the defender should try to decrease the denial-of-service cost G in
order to minimize the loss. Please note, when  / E is larger than 0.03/1.755, there are
three possible Nash equilibria NE3, NE4 and NE1, therefore, the gain of attacker is
always 3.0, and the gain of the defender could be either -3.0 or -4.2.
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gain of attacker
gain of defender

4.255
3.8
Nash
equilibrium
0

NE3(NE4)

NE2

3.80

-1.2

NE1

4.255

G

-4.255
-5

Figure 4.8 Nash equilibria v.s. G.

gain of attacker
gain of defender
3.0
Nash
equilibrium
0

NE3(NE4)
NE1

NE3(NE4)

0.03

-3
-4.2

Figure 4.9 Nash equilibria v.s. β.

β

72

gain of attacker
gain of defender
3.0
Nash
equilibrium
0

NE3(NE4)
NE1

NE3(NE4)

1.755

E

-3
-4.2

Figure 4.10 Nash equilibria v.s. E.

When information value F is very high, the gain of defender F  P1.5C under
(1.7v, 1.5v) will be far smaller than other gains, therefore, defender will choose 1.7v as
the threshold voltage to avoid heavy loss, which means NE3(NE4) will be Nash
equilibria as in Figure 4.11. When F is large enough, the gain of attacker and the loss of
defender keep constant, i.e., 3.0 as the gain of attacker and 4.2 as the loss of defender,
which are shown in Figure 4.11.
According to Table 4.3, when the cost caused by noise C is large, G  P1.7 C
decreases, the defender will use low threshold voltage under this situation, and the Nash
equilibria may be either NE1 or NE2. Then the attacker will decide the equilibrium based
on their gain, in this example, gain of attacker under NE2 is larger than under NE1.
Therefore, with the increase of C , NE2 will be the Nash equilibria as shown in Figure
4.12.
Based on above experimental results, the gain of attacker and defender will keep
constant with increasing F, E, ,C except for G . Therefore, it is very important for the
defender to minimize the denial-of-serve cost G .
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gain of attacker
gain of defender

3.445
3.0
Nash
equilibrium
0

NE2

NE1
3.745

NE3(NE4)

F

4.2

-3.0
-4.2

Figure 4.11 Nash equilibria v.s. F.

gain of attacker
gain of defender
4.255
3.0
Nash
equilibrium
0

NE3(NE4)

NE2
100

-3.0
-5.0
Figure 4.12 Nash equilibria v.s. C.

C
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4.5. CONCLUSION
Based on the observation in [49], it is demonstrated that the attacker could
improve the effectiveness of CPA to RDVS S-box cryptosystem by using low power
supply voltage. On the other hand, the defender could protect the cryptosystem by setting
threshold voltage to trigger an alarm when the power supply voltage is low. Furthermore,
the problem between the attacker and the defender is formulated as a game, and a gametheoretic methodology is proposed to analyze both the optimal attacking power supply
voltage for the attacker and the detection threshold voltage for the defender.
Theoretical analysis is done to calculate the Nash equilibria, which is also verified
using a game solver in this dissertation. The following important properties are gotten
based on the analysis:
1) When denial-of-service cost or the cost of attack is high, Nash equilibrium prefers
to locate at low threshold voltage and low attack power supply voltage (NE1 in
the example).
2) When information value F is very high, high threshold voltage and high attack
power supply voltage goes to Nash equilibria (NE4 in the example).
3) Only when the cost of alarm triggered due to noise is high, NE2 may be the Nash
equilibria, which represents the attack behavior.
Based on these properties, only when the condition of (3) is true, the attacker will
attack the system, therefore, the defender can avoid attack under most of cases by
choosing right threshold voltage.
Another important result of the proposed methodology is that the loss of the
defender is decided by the value of secret information, and the payoff when the alarm is
triggered, which is already known and can be decided by the defender. Furthermore, the
probability of alarm trigged by noise for different threshold voltage can be also derived,
and then the defender will know the exact range of the loss under different threshold
voltage. Therefore, the proposed approach could help the defender find the conditions
that limit their loss to expected value for different cryptosystems with different
information value.

75
5. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
5.1. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS
The first part of this dissertation studies and solves the timing violation problem
caused by process variation in sub-threshold designs. Sub-threshold designs are a popular
option in many energy constrained applications. However, a major bottleneck for these
designs is the challenge in attaining timing closure. Most of the paths in sub-threshold
designs can become critical paths due to the purely random process variation on threshold
voltage, which exponentially impacts the gate delay. In order to address timing violations
caused by process variation, post-silicon tuning is widely used through body biasing
technology at the cost of heavy power and area overhead. Therefore, it is imperative to
select only a small group of the gates with body biasing for post-silicon-tuning.
Existed body biasing schemes with multiple body biasing voltage domains and
multiple body biasing voltage levels involve not just routing overhead but also design
control complexity. Therefore, the first contribution of this dissertation is to explore the
possibility of using only one body bias voltage domain with a single body bias voltage in
sub-threshold design. This selective body biasing scheme only involves modest area
overhead based on the experiment result, and no extra control circuit is needed.
Therefore, the proposed scheme is very practical for low cost and low power design.
In the first work, the selective body biasing problem is formulated as an
optimization model with statistical inequality constraints. To the best knowledge of
authors, this is the first time that this selective body biasing problem is formulated as a
optimization problem, and it is further solved through an adaptive algorithm, which is the
second contribution of this dissertation.
In order to achieve a better solution for the selective body biasing problem, the
problem is reformulated alternatively as a LSIP problem, and propose an efficient IHCS
algorithm to solve the LSIP problem with a finite number of mixed-integer linear
programming. Compared with the adaptive filtering approach, experimental results on
industrial designs using 65nm sub-threshold library demonstrate that the new IHCS
approach can improve the pass rate by up to 7.3x with a speed up to 4.1x, using the same
number of body biasing gates and about the same power consumption.
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The second part of this dissertation studies the attack and defense problem in
power analysis attack to RDVS system. It is demonstrated that the resistance of RDVS
system to CPA can be undermined by providing lower off-chip power supply voltage. In
order to improve the resistance under lower attack voltage, the defender can insert power
voltage monitor into the cryptosystems and trigger an alarm to protect valued information
once the power supply voltage is lower than the expected voltage (threshold voltage). The
problem is further formulated as a non-zero sum game model, and the attacker and the
circuit supplier (defender) are the players of this game. The S-box is used in this
dissertation as the vehicle to show how the game model works, but it can be extend to
other cryptosystem easily. The analysis of the Nash equilibrium in this game shows
valued guidelines to defender for a success protection.

5.2. FUTURE WORK
For the selective body biasing scheme, the future works include but are not
limited to the following topics:
1) The current optimization target is power, besides that, the area overhead
should also be a very important factor in practice. When considering area
overhead, choice of body biased gates will be a strong function of layout
due to well design rules, routing complexity, etc. Therefore, in future
work, area could be taken into account as the objective function or
constraint to achieve the target of low area overhead.
2) Monte Carlo simulations are used to verify the performance of design with
selective body biasing, which is very timing consuming. The theoretical
analysis of pass rate will be helpful to predict and evaluate the
performance of the algorithm. Furthermore, the pass rate in closed form
expression can also be involved in the constraint or optimization target.
3) The formulation of selective body biasing is path based and in order to
solve the scaling problem, representative path method is used. However,
the extraction of the representative path still consumes considerable time
for large design. Therefore, block-based formulation could be studied in
future work.
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For the second part job about the game theoretic approach on RDVS system, the
following improvement could be done in future:
4) Only random dynamic voltage scaling is considered in this dissertation,
and it is worthwhile to consider random dynamic frequency. The game
model can be extended to find out the optimal scaling frequency.
5) There are various SCAs including SPA, DPA, CPA and LPA, etc. Only
CPA is considered in this dissertation. It will be meaningful to study the
resistance of proposed game theoretic approach to other popular SCAs.
Furthermore, all experiments in this dissertation are based on FPGA, and
it would be interesting to evaluate the performance based on ASICs.
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